Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 96

Issue 5

Article 2

5-2021

Recovering the Tort Remedy for Federal Official Wrongdoing
Gregory Sisk
Laghi Distinguished Chair in Law at the University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota)

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Supreme Court of the United States Commons, and the
Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
96 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1789 (2021)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Law Review at NDLScholarship. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For more
information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-5\NDL502.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

4-MAY-21

17:30

RECOVERING THE TORT REMEDY FOR FEDERAL
OFFICIAL WRONGDOING
Gregory Sisk*
As the Supreme Court weakens the Bivens constitutional tort cause of action and federal
officers avoid liability for unlawful behavior through qualified immunity, we should recollect the
merit of the common-law tort remedy for holding the federal government accountable for official
wrongdoing. For more than a century after ratification of the Constitution, federal officers who
trespassed on the rights of American citizens could be held personally liable under common-law
tort theories, but then routinely were indemnified by the government.
The modern Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) roughly replicates the original regime for
official wrongdoing by imposing liability directly on the government. Through modest revisions
to the FTCA, most claims for abuse of federal government power can be adequately addressed
through a common-law tort cause of action. The FTCA should be reformed to put claims for
intentional wrongdoing on a more secure footing.
Constitutional principles remain central to adjudication of tort claims against the federal
government. First, ordinary tort elements and defenses, such as probable cause in false arrest
cases and justified use of force in assault and battery cases, may be refuted by asserting constitutional-equivalent violations. Second, discretionary policy immunity under the FTCA is precluded when constitutional limits are transgressed, as no federal officer has discretion to bypass
constitutional requirements. And, because the doctrine of qualified immunity is misplaced in a
tort regime, the commands of the Constitution should be directly enforced, without the diluting
appraisal of whether the constitutional directive was clearly established in prior court precedent.
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INTRODUCTION
It didn’t start out this way. When the American constitutional republic
began more than two centuries ago, a remedy in damages for misconduct by
federal officers was generally accepted and did not encounter obstacles of
governmental immunity.1 But by the late twentieth century, a regime of allencompassing official immunity from tort liability,2 together with the birth
and then near-death of judicial implication of a constitutional damages remedy,3 has nearly suffocated accountability in court for federal official wrongdoing. The promising substitute of a collective federal government liability
through a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity has been neglected by Congress as circumstances change over the decades and now risks being sidelined
by overly expansive applications of a policy immunity exception.4
1
2
3
4

See
See
See
See

infra
infra
infra
infra

Section I.A.
Sections I.B, I.C.
Section I.D.
Section I.E.
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As the Supreme Court weakens the Bivens constitutional tort cause of
action and federal officers avoid liability for unlawful behavior through qualified immunity,5 we should recollect the merit of the common-law tort remedy for holding the federal government accountable for official
wrongdoing.6 For more than a century after ratification of the Constitution,
federal officers who trespassed on the rights of American citizens could be
held liable under common-law tort theories, uncomplicated by immunity for
wrongful government actors.7 Now is the time to return to the legislative
branch to recover the tort-based solution for government wrongdoing.
And it doesn’t have to stay this way. The modern Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA)8 roughly replicates the original regime for official wrongdoing
by imposing liability directly on the government through the traditional
medium of tort.9 Through modest revisions to the FTCA, most claims for
abuse of federal government power can be adequately addressed through a
common-law tort cause of action.
When federal agents are negligent, the injured have a well-worn path to
redress in court through the FTCA.10 But when government officials deliberately impose harm on others, the road to recovery is muddy and covered with
obstacles.11 The FTCA presently excludes claims for assault, battery, false
arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, subject to a special
proviso allowing such claims when the federal agent is a law enforcement
officer.12 The FTCA should be reformed to put claims for intentional wrongdoing by any federal employee on a secure footing.13
For this tort-based remedy to effectively cover “ordinary common-law
torts,”14 the Supreme Court must clarify the scope of the FTCA’s justified
immunity for policymaking discretionary functions.15 When properly
applied, this exception avoids “judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and
administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy
through the medium of an action in tort.”16 Unfortunately, in the lower federal courts, simple failures in public safety have regularly been levitated into
imaginary policy meditations.17 With acquiescence by the courts, govern5 See infra Sections I.B, I.C.
6 See infra Section II.B.
7 See JAMES E. PFANDER, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AND THE WAR ON TERROR 3–6 (2017).
8 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671–2680 (2018).
9 See infra Section II.A.
10 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (making the United States liable for the “negligent or
wrongful act or omission” of a federal government employee).
11 See infra Section II.B. See generally Gregory C. Sisk, Holding the Federal Government
Accountable for Sexual Assault, 104 IOWA L. REV. 731 (2019).
12 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2018).
13 See infra Section II.B.
14 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 28 (1953).
15 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2018).
16 United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467
U.S. 797, 814 (1984).
17 See infra Section II.C.
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ment litigators have transformed the discretionary function exception into a
sweeping immunity for official wrongdoing in areas of mundane activity and
on matters that are far removed from the arena of policy judgment.18
Constitutional principles remain central to adjudication of tort claims
against the federal government. First, ordinary tort claims, such as false
arrest or false imprisonment, may be defeated by the presence of probable
cause as a common-law equivalent to constitutional expectations.19 Likewise,
certain defenses, such as the justified use of force in response to a commonlaw assault and battery claim, may be refuted by asserting the equivalent of
constitutional violations.20 Second, the invocation of discretionary policy
immunity under the FTCA is precluded when constitutional limits are transgressed, as no federal officer has discretion to bypass constitutional requirements.21 By focusing attention on the collective liability of the United States
government through the FTCA, rather than on individual liability of federal
officers through constitutional tort claims, the defense of qualified immunity
falls away.22
I.

THE PAST
A.

AND

PRESENT

OF

LIABILITY

FOR

FEDERAL OFFICIAL WRONGDOING

The Early Practice of Common-Law Tort Claims for Wrongdoing by Federal
Officers

At the beginning of the American constitutional experiment, there was
broad and authoritative acceptance of a common-law cause of action for
damages caused by the misconduct of another person, including a federal
official acting under official orders. In his definitive work on federal officer
liability and indemnification for public wrongs, James Pfander explains that,
from the early days of the republic, courts adopted “common-law norms to
“appl[y] a fairly unyielding body of tort law in assessing the liability of government actors for invasions of rights to person and property.”23 During the
nineteenth century, if a person suffered an injury at the hands of a federal
government employee that was cognizable as a trespass by the common law,
the plaintiff could recover damages in state or federal court against that government agent in his individual capacity.24 As the Supreme Court confirmed
recently in its unanimous decision in Tanzin v. Tanvir,25 “These common-law
causes of action [against government officials] remained available through
the 19th century and into the 20th.”26
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id.
See infra subsection II.D.1.
Id.
See infra subsection II.D.2.
See infra subsection II.D.1.
PFANDER, supra note 7, at 3.
Id. at 1–17.
141 S. Ct. 486 (2020) (8–0 decision).
Id. at 491.
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The Supreme Court established the framework for common-law federal
official liability very early in the 1804 decision of Little v. Barreme.27 When
American trade with French ports was restricted by statute during cold war
tensions between the United States and France, the commander of a United
States naval ship ordered seizure of a cargo ship that he plausibly believed
was American in origin and engaged in forbidden French trade.28 After forfeiture proceedings against the vessel were initiated by the commander in
Boston federal court, the owner of the ship counterclaimed for damages and
asserted it was a neutral ship registered under the Danish flag.29 On later
review, the Supreme Court concluded the seizure violated the
nonintercourse statute because it had been executed as the ship was departing a French port rather than arriving to one.30
Notwithstanding that the naval commander was acting pursuant to presidential orders, the Supreme Court held in Little that such directives “cannot
change the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which without those
instructions would have been a plain trespass.”31 For the Court, Chief Justice
Marshall explained that, despite his original inclination to bar damages
against a federal officer who acted under “orders from the legitimate authority,” he came to the conclusion that the claim for damages could proceed
against the commander individually.32
Nor were individual federal officers protected by governmental immunity in this early period of the American republic.33 As Justice Story
explained in another ship seizure case, “matters of state” and “great public
purposes,” such as the need “to act on a sudden emergency, or to prevent an
irreparable mischief,” were beyond the proper purview of the judiciary.34
Rather, Justice Story said, “this Court can only look to the questions, whether
the laws have been violated.”35 And if the law had been violated, then “justice demands, that the injured party should receive a suitable redress.”36
In a mid-nineteenth century treatise, Justice Story explained that the
personal liability of federal officers for positive legal wrongs could not be
excused by showing “that they have acted bonâ fide, and to the best of their
27 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). On Little, see generally PFANDER, supra note 7, at 6–8.
28 Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 170–73.
29 Id. at 172–75.
30 Id. at 177–79.
31 Id. at 179.
32 Id.
33 PFANDER, supra note 7, at 3. But see Andrew Kent, Lessons for Bivens and Qualified
Immunity Debates from Nineteenth-Century Damages Litigation Against Federal Officers, 96 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1755, 1761 (2021) (arguing for qualification of the historical claims about a
“‘pure legality’ model of early American judicial behavior in officer tort suits in which
immunity was unavailable” and policy factors “were ignored”).
34 The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 366–67 (1824).
35 Id. at 367.
36 Id.
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skill and judgment.”37 Good faith not being a legitimate defense, the officer
could escape liability only by showing “there has been no misfeasance or negligence, and no excess of authority, by public agents, in the execution of
their duty.”38
In sum, as James Pfander says, “Nineteenth century jurists . . . assumed
that civilian courts were the proper forum for claims brought against military,
revenue, and postal officers who exceeded the bounds of their authority and
inflicted injuries on innocent third persons.”39
This is not to say that the federal officer was left to suffer alone the
consequences of faithfully following a governmental policy or action directive
that a court later found had wrongfully caused harm. Just as the Supreme
Court assumed that a tort claim was properly allowed for the victim of the
official wrongdoing, the Court assumed that the federal government would
be “bound to indemnify the officer.”40 By enacting private bills indemnifying
the federal officers held personally liable in these common-law trespass
actions, the federal government was held accountable, if indirectly, for official wrongdoing.41 As James Pfander and Jonathan Hunt concluded, “congressional indemnity contributed to a regime in which the Court imposed
relatively strict official liability and Congress provided relatively routine
indemnification for officers acting in good faith.”42
B.

The Rise of Common-Law Immunity for Federal Officers for Public Wrong Tort
Suits

In the context of common-law tort suits against federal officers, the crucial issue has never been whether a cause of action is cognizable43 (which is
the threshold question for constitutional tort claims against federal
officers44). Rather, the question that drew increasing attention during the
course of the twentieth century was whether the individual government
employee should be spared the purported hardships of being held to suit
through a doctrine of immunity.
With Chief Justice Marshall’s denial of any good faith defense to a common-law tort claim by a federal officer,45 the courts in the nineteenth century
proceeded directly to adjudication on the merits without any immunity com37 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AS A BRANCH OF COMMERCIAL
MARITIME JURISPRUDENCE § 320, at 398 (5th ed. rev. Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1857).
38 Id.
39 PFANDER, supra note 7, at 16.
40 Tracy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 80, 98–99 (1836).
41 PFANDER, supra note 7, at 3.
42 See James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1928 (2010).
43 See supra Section I.A.
44 See infra Section I.D.
45 See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.

AND
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plications.46 At the same time, the sovereign immunity of the federal government itself was taken for granted.47 However, as James Pfander and Jonathan
Hunt note, “sovereign immunity in the early republic served less to authorize
lawless conduct on the part of the federal government than to allocate
responsibility for appropriations and adjudication as between the legislative
and judicial branches of government.”48
This approach reached its zenith with the Supreme Court’s 1882 decision in United States v. Lee.49 The case involved a post–Civil War suit for ejectment from the seized Arlington estate filed by the heir of Robert E. Lee
against the federal officers who held the property in custody for the United
States.50 After expressing doubts about its validity but accepting the federal
government’s immunity as settled precedent,51 a slim majority of the Court
refused to extend sovereign immunity beyond a suit framed directly against
the United States.52 When the United States is not a party to the suit, the
Court ruled, a doctrine of immunity “is not permitted to interfere with the
judicial enforcement of the established rights of plaintiffs” under the common-law claim for ejectment.53 Citing the principle that “[n]o man in this
country is so high that he is above the law,” the Court allowed the ejectment
claim to proceed.54
However, with the growth of the regulatory state, the suitability of common-law tort claims for resolving disputes about distinctly governmental
functions came more directly into question. In contrast with the frontal and
affirmative wrongdoing challenged as trespass claims in the nineteenth-century republic, courts became increasingly uncomfortable with personal liability for government officers who were exercising policy judgment toward
peculiarly governmental ends. Toward the end of the nineteenth century
and into the twentieth century, the courts began to draw a distinction
between compensation for positive wrongs by federal officers and challenges
to policy decisions.55 And this occurred simultaneously with a parallel judi46 See David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44
U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 14–19 (1972) (describing “[t]he substantial disfavor of governmental
immunity” for government officers during the nineteenth century).
47 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411–12 (1821) (accepting the principle that the United States cannot be sued without its consent as the “universally received
opinion”).
48 Pfander & Hunt, supra note 42, at 1868.
49 106 U.S. 196 (1882). For a general discussion of United States v. Lee in the evolution
of the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity, see GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT § 2.3(b)(2), at 78–81 (2016). For more on the historical background to this case, a book-length treatment may be found in ANTHONY J. GAUGHAN, THE
LAST BATTLE OF THE CIVIL WAR: UNITED STATES VERSUS LEE, 1861–1883 (2011).
50 Lee, 106 U.S. at 196–99.
51 Id. at 205–08.
52 Id. at 208–23.
53 Id. at 207–08.
54 Id. at 220.
55 See infra notes 64–79 and accompanying text.
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cial shifting of the line between what was accepted as a suit directed against
an officer and what was recognized as in substance a claim against the government itself.56
On the question of the proper party defendant to a claim, the Supreme
Court retreated from the apparent ruling of United States v. Lee, which turned
on denomination of the party (either the United States or a federal officer)
in a pleading.57 In the 1949 decision of Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp.,58 the Court recharacterized Lee as a constitutional exception to federal
sovereign immunity because the seizure of the land constituted a taking of
property without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.59
Absent a constitutional transgression, the Court ruled that a suit seeking
relief that would effectively be enforced against the government itself was in
substance a suit against the sovereign.60 The Larson Court was “unwilling to
countenance the fiction that a suit against an officer invariably may be distinguished from one against the United States simply by the arrangement of
names in the pleading.”61 In sum, an agent of the United States who is acting within the scope of authority conferred by statute may not be held personally liable for actions taken that substantively are the actions of the
principal and for which the relief sought is in reality against the United
States.
While Larson did not directly interrupt claims for damages for the positive wrongs of a federal officer, an expanding common-law doctrine of official immunity weakened (though did not eliminate) the tort remedy directed
against a federal officer. Given the breadth of government activities that
could give rise to ordinary tort suits against a government officer, the courts
worried that indiscriminate lawsuits could severely impair the ability of government employees to do their jobs. Although judicial and legislative immunity had a long pedigree in the common law,62 the courts newly fashioned
immunity for executive officials as well during the twentieth century.63
The sharpest swing toward nearly complete immunity for federal officers
appeared to come in the 1959 decision of Barr v. Matteo.64 In that decision,
involving a common-law libel claim against a government official for issuing a
press release, a plurality of the Supreme Court gave greater weight to “protection of the public interest by shielding responsible governmental officers
against the harassment and inevitable hazards of vindictive or ill-founded
56 See infra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
57 See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
58 337 U.S. 682 (1949). For a general discussion of Larson in the evolution of the
doctrine of federal sovereign immunity, see SISK, supra note 49, § 2.3(b)(3), at 81–84.
59 Larson, 337 U.S. at 696–97.
60 Id. at 686–89.
61 SISK, supra note 49, § 2.3(b)(3), at 82.
62 See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 201–04 (1881) (recognizing legislative
immunity for members of Congress under the Speech and Debate Clause); Bradley v.
Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 354 (1872) (recognizing absolute judicial immunity).
63 See generally SISK, supra note 49, § 5.6(b), at 364–66.
64 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
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damage suits brought on account of action taken in the exercise of their
official responsibilities.”65 Although the plurality opinion repeatedly
referred to the exercise of “discretion,”66 the opinion could be read to suggest an all-encompassing privilege for all federal officer actions “within the
outer perimeter of [the officer’s] line of duty.”67 Ann Woolhandler
described the Court in Barr v. Matteo as giving “its explicit imprimatur to
broad discretionary immunity for federal executive officials.”68
If Barr v. Matteo cloaked federal officers with a thick blanket of immunity, the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision in Westfall v. Erwin69 pulled that
blanket down at least partway. In a lawsuit by a government employee who
alleged supervisors had negligently allowed him to be exposed to a toxic substance, the Court moved away from the absolute immunity arguably extended
by Barr v. Matteo to every federal officer acting in the line of duty.70 The
Westfall Court unanimously turned away the argument that “effective government” demanded “shielding an official from state-law tort liability without
regard to whether the alleged tortious conduct is discretionary in nature.”71
Viewing official immunity from tort liability as protecting administrative
“decisionmaking discretion,”72 the Westfall Court held that “absolute immunity from state-law tort actions” should be granted only when both “the conduct of federal officials is within the scope of their official duties and the
conduct is discretionary in nature.”73 While declining “to determine the
level of discretion required before immunity may attach,”74 the Court
rejected the “wooden interpretation” that “some modicum of choice” sufficed to invoke the privilege.75 By referring to “officials exercis[ing] decisionmaking discretion”76 and by noting the argument that the officer in the
case was not involved in “policy-making work,”77 the Court plainly tied official immunity to the function of the executive in setting governmental policy.
With the Westfall decision, the period of judicial articulation of officer
immunity from tort claims came to a close, before superseding legislative
action.78 The Supreme Court had drawn a rough line between (1) direct
officer conduct that constituted a positive wrong and caused concrete personal harm, for which personal liability was proper and immunity was not
65 Id. at 565.
66 Id. at 573, 574.
67 Id. at 575.
68 Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RSRV. L.
REV. 396, 456 (1987).
69 484 U.S. 292 (1988).
70 Id. at 293–95.
71 Id. at 296.
72 Id. at 297.
73 Id. at 297–98.
74 Id. at 299.
75 Id. at 298.
76 Id. at 297.
77 Id. at 299.
78 See infra Section I.C.
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afforded, and (2) officer participation in policymaking decisions on behalf of
the United States government, for which personal liability was inappropriate
and immunity attached. As the Westfall Court said in restricting the privilege
to discretionary decisionmaking, to extend broad and absolute immunity
would have meant that “[a]n injured party with an otherwise meritorious tort
claim is denied compensation simply because he had the misfortune to be
injured by a federal official.”79
C.

The Enactment of Expansive Statutory Immunity for Federal Officers from Tort
Claims

After the Supreme Court’s Westfall decision had opened the door to personal tort liability of federal officers when engaged in routine activities,80
Congress’s enactment of the Westfall Act81 slammed the door shut with a
vengeance.82 While the Westfall decision had largely restored the historical
approach by which a federal officer was personally liable for traditional tort
claims arising outside of distinctly governmental settings, the Westfall Act
dramatically departed from longstanding practice to extend complete immunity for even garden-variety tortious conduct committed by government
employees during their work.
As outlined below, the Westfall Act makes no distinction between tort
claims for direct and positive tortious wrongdoing by a federal officer and
those quasi-tort claims that object to the harmful effects of government regulation.83 Both are swept under the rug of immunity. Nor does the shield of
the Westfall Act for the individual government employee hinge on whether a
substitute tort remedy is provided through a cognizable action against the
government itself (although that often is the result).84
Congress responded to the Westfall decision with unusual alacrity, acting
that very same year to overturn the Supreme Court’s more limited officer
immunity doctrine. In 1988, Congress enacted the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act85—commonly known as the Westfall
Act.86 The Westfall Act grants immunity to individual federal employees
from common-law tort claims if the employee was acting within the scope of
employment.87 Whether the federal officer is sued in state court or federal
court, the Westfall Act converts a state common-law tort claim into a federal
tort cause of action against the United States government itself and proceed79 Westfall, 484 U.S. at 295.
80 See supra notes 72–79 and accompanying text.
81 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)–(d) (2018).
82 See Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 491 (2020) (“[T]he Westfall Act foreclosed
common-law claims for damages against federal officials . . . .”).
83 See infra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
84 See infra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
85 Pub. L. No. 100-694, §§ 5–6, 102 Stat. 4564–4565 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2679(b)–(d) (2018)).
86 On the Westfall Act, see generally SISK, supra note 49, § 5.6(c), at 366–77.
87 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2018).
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ing exclusively in the federal court.88 With the United States substituted as
the sole defendant, the former state tort claim against the officer now goes
forward against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA).89
When considering the adequacy of remedies for official wrongdoing,
three distinctive aspects of the Westfall Act should be highlighted:
First, the immunity from state-law tort claims granted to the federal
employee is astonishingly complete, shielding not only the work of policy
decisionmakers but also the routine activities of every federal employee while
on the job. The test for absolute immunity is not whether a federal officer is
exercising policy discretion but only whether a federal employee is “acting
within the scope of his office or employment.”90 The Westfall Act is not
designed to protect the public interest in effective administration but rather
to avoid the personal liability of every federal employee, so long as the
alleged tortious wrongdoing falls within the scope of employment (as determined by state respondeat superior rules).91
Second, the substitution of the United States as the defendant under the
FTCA is not a guarantee of an alternative remedy. To be sure, the federal
government as a deep-pocket defendant often will prove to be a superior
target of a plaintiff’s tort claim. But the eliminated tort claim against the
individual federal officer is replaced by an FTCA claim against the United
States, subject to all the narrowing terms of that statutory waiver of federal
sovereign immunity.92 As I’ve written previously, “if the United States is
found to be immune from liability under the FTCA due to the limitations or
exceptions of that statute, the substitution of the United States as the sole
defendant is not thereby undone nor may the individual employee be
brought back into the lawsuit.”93
Take, for example, a claim by a military dependent for medical malpractice against an Army doctor stationed abroad that is converted into a suit
against the United States and then dismissed under the FTCA’s exception for
claims arising in a foreign country.94 While the claim against the United
States under the FTCA encounters a fatal obstacle, the Westfall Act immunity
88 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1)–(2) (2018).
89 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671–2680 (2018). On the FTCA, see infra Section I.E.
90 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2018).
91 See Lyons v. Brown, 158 F.3d 605, 608 (1st Cir. 1998); id. at 609 (“Federal law determines whether a person is a federal employee and defines the nature and contours of his
official responsibilities; but the law of the state in which the tortious act allegedly occurred
determines whether the employee was acting within the scope of those responsibilities.”);
see also Shirk v. United States ex rel. Dep’t of Interior, 773 F.3d 999, 1005 (9th Cir. 2014);
RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1143 (6th Cir. 1996). On
the governing law and factual determination of the scope of employment question, see
generally SISK, supra note 49, § 5.6(c)(4), at 371–73.
92 On the FTCA, see infra Section I.E.
93 SISK, supra note 49, § 5.6(c)(2), at 368.
94 United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 161–62 (1991).
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for the individual physician nonetheless remained securely fastened, thus
leaving the plaintiff without any remedy against any defendant in any court.95
Third, the Westfall Act by its express terms does not apply to a claim
“brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States.”96 Thus,
the Westfall Act does not itself preclude a so-called constitutional tort
through the judicially implied Bivens cause of action, as discussed next.97
While scholars have argued that the explicit Westfall Act exception for constitutional claims amounts to a congressional ratification of the Bivens claim,98
the provision could instead be read as acquiescing in then-existing precedent
without endorsing it.99 In any event, as discussed next, little remains today of
an implied constitutional tort claim.
D.

Judicial Birth and Partial Burial of a Constitutional Tort Claim Against
Federal Officers

While the common-law tort remedy against the individual federal officer
was being submerged beneath immunity in the last three decades of the
twentieth century, the Supreme Court was experimenting with something of
an alternative through an implied cause of action directly under the Constitution.100 By the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century, however, this experiment came to a screeching halt,101 mostly closing off
personal liability of federal officers for wrongs committed in the course of
public duties—whether defined by the common law or by the Constitution.
The Constitution does not speak clearly to the availability of a private
cause of action, especially as to an individual officer as contrasted with the
government itself.102 Nor has Congress expressly provided for a civil rights
action against federal officers for infringement on constitutional rights, as
Congress did for officers acting under color of state law when it enacted
§ 1983 after the Civil War.103 Indeed, more than 180 years passed after ratifi95 Id.
96 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) (2018).
97 See infra Section I.D.
98 James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional
Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 121–26, 137 (2009) (arguing that, through the Westfall Act
exception, Congress has thereby acted “to preserve and ratify” and “solidify” the Bivens
remedy); Alexander A. Reinert & Lumen N. Mulligan, Asking the First Question: Reframing
Bivens After Minneci, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1473, 1476 (2013) (“Congress codified Bivens, at
least as it existed in 1988, when it passed the Westfall Act.”).
99 SISK, supra note 49, § 5.7(b)(3), at 382 (describing the alternative picture that,
through the Westfall Act exception, “Congress accepted the table as it had been set without
thereby endorsing where the silverware and plates had been placed”).
100 See infra notes 104–12 and accompanying text.
101 See infra notes 113–18 and accompanying text.
102 See SISK, supra note 49, § 5.7(a), at 377. Only a few constitutional provisions, such as
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, expressly contemplate compensation for government conduct, with the expectation being payment by the government itself. See U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
103 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
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cation of the Constitution before the Supreme Court first recognized a private damages remedy against a federal government employee premised upon
a constitutional violation.
In the 1971 decision of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics,104 the Supreme Court held that a damage action should
be afforded to plaintiffs against federal law enforcement officers for violation
of the Fourth Amendment105 right to be free from an unreasonable search
and seizure.106 Precisely because this constitutional cause of action had been
formed through judicial implication, rather than legislative adoption, it has
been controversial from the beginning.107
During the first decade of this experiment, the Supreme Court extended
this Bivens constitutional tort claim to claims for federal employment discrimination108 in violation of the equal protection component of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment109 and for wrongful prison conditions110
that constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.111 Looking at the landscape at this auspicious time, Peter Schuck
described the Bivens remedy as “a powerful new string to a victim’s bow.”112
By the end of its second decade, however, the Bivens experiment had
been suspended though not overturned. The Supreme Court proved reluctant to further extend this judicially implied cause of action into new contexts, tending instead to find that the Bivens remedy has been displaced by
alternative statutory schemes or there were “special factors counselling hesitation.”113 Lamenting that the promise of a damages remedy for constitutional
104 403 U.S. 388, 389–90 (1971). For The Story of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, see James E. Pfander’s chapter by that title in FEDERAL
COURTS STORIES 275 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010).
105 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
106 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396–97.
107 For a recent argument that the judge-made remedies in Bivens comports with historical practice and originalist understandings of the Constitution, see Stephen I. Vladeck,
The Inconsistent Originalism of Judge-Made Remedies Against Federal Officers, 96 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1869 (2021).
108 Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 231, 234 (1979).
109 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
110 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–25 (1980).
111 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
112 PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 42
(1983).
113 Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378, 388–90 (1983) (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971)) (declining to extend
Bivens to a claim by a federal employee that his First Amendment free speech rights had
been violated by his superior); see also Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 417, 419–20,
428–29 (1988) (declining to recognize a Bivens action for alleged violations of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in the administrative process for Social Security
disability benefits); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 671–72, 683–84 (1987) (refusing
to allow a Bivens suit for a serviceman who had been the subject of secret medical experiments by the Army in supplying him with the hallucinogenic drug LSD without his knowl-
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violations was eroding, Susan Bandes said “there is little left of the Bivens
principle.”114
The survival of the Bivens remedy fell under increasing doubt after the
turn of the century. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, Justices Thomas and Scalia declared Bivens to be “a relic of the heady days in
which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action.”115
Finally, a half-century after it began, the Supreme Court brought the
experiment to a near end in Ziglar v. Abbasi.116 A four-Justice majority (of six
Justices participating) declared that “expanding the Bivens remedy is now a
‘disfavored’ judicial activity.”117 While not overturning Bivens and its early
progeny in their specific contexts, the Court is much less likely to recognize a
Bivens remedy in any new context. As Stephen Vladeck writes, “Abbasi could
be a huge nail in the coffin of Bivens.”118
Even as recognition of the Bivens cause of action slowed, the defense of
qualified immunity for officers, state and federal, emerged and accelerated as
another obstacle to successful tort-like claims against federal government
employees for constitutional wrongdoing.
In Bivens itself, Justice Black dissented for fear that creation of a damages remedy “might deter officials from the proper and honest performance
of their duties.”119 Not long after the Bivens decision, the Supreme Court in
its 1982 decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald120 ruled that qualified immunity protects a federal officer who is sued for a constitutional violation.121 The
Harlow Court held that a federal officer is liable only if he or she violated
“clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.”122
In recent years, the Court has demanded more and seemingly literal
clarity in the prior judicial articulation of the constitutional rule before
allowing liability, by calling for “existing precedent” that puts “the statutory
edge); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (rejecting a Bivens action for enlisted
military personnel who alleged unconstitutional actions by superior officers).
114 Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
289, 293–94 (1995).
115 Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 568 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
116 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
117 Id. at 1857 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)).
118 Steve Vladeck, On Justice Kennedy’s Flawed and Depressing Narrowing of Constitutional
Damages Remedies, JUST SEC. (June 19, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/42334/justicekennedys-flawed-depressing-narrowing-constitutional-damages-remedies. On Ziglar, see
generally Joanna C. Schwartz, Alexander Reinert & James E. Pfander, Going Rogue: The
Supreme Court’s Newfound Hostility to Policy-Based Bivens Claims, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1835
(2021).
119 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
429 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
120 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
121 Id. at 809.
122 Id. at 818.
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or constitutional question beyond debate.”123 Regularly reversing lower
court decisions, the Court has “reiterate[d] the longstanding principle that
‘clearly established law’ should not be defined ‘at a high level of generality’ ”
and instead must “particularize [the law] to the facts of the case.”124 As Jay
Schweikert puts it, a civil rights plaintiff can only avoid qualified immunity by
“identify[ing] not just a clear legal rule but a prior case with functionally
identical facts.”125 In the Court’s words, only a “plainly incompetent” government official acting in clear disregard of constitutional expectations will lose
the defense of qualified immunity.126
Some optimistic observers believe that qualified immunity jurisprudence
may be in a transitional state in the Supreme Court. Several members of the
Supreme Court “have authored or joined opinions expressing sympathy”
with the theoretical and practical criticisms of a doctrine that allows a constitutional violation to be left unremedied because of supposed uncertainties in
the law.127 Nor is there any historical basis for a doctrine that qualifies a
government official’s duty to comply with constitutional standards. Speaking
to the doctrine as it originally evolved in the context of § 1983 constitutional
suits against state officers, William Baude observes that “there was no wellestablished, good-faith defense in suits about constitutional violations when
Section 1983 was enacted, nor in Section 1983 suits early after its
enactment.”128
The worry that public officials would be left personally liable for civil
rights damages awards is now understood to be without empirical support.
As Joanna Schwartz has found, the chance that a government officer will have
to personally pay a damages award is vanishingly small, as officers who are

123 Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
124 White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551–52 (2017) (per curiam) (first quoting al-Kidd,
563 U.S. at 742; and then quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
125 JAY R. SCHWEIKERT, QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: A LEGAL, PRACTICAL, AND MORAL FAILURE 1
(Cato Inst. Pol’y Analysis No. 901, 2020), https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/qualifiedimmunity-legal-practical-moral-failure?queryID=A186aeba6200645f78cd76d8e3f50627; see
also Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1161 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (criticizing
clearly-established-law doctrine as demanding “a factually identical case” precedent).
126 Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 6 (2013) (per curiam) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at
743).
127 Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1797, 1800 (2018); see also Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1162 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting
qualified immunity has become “an absolute shield for law enforcement officers” that has
“gutt[ed] the deterrent effect of the Fourth Amendment”); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct.
1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“In
further elaborating the doctrine of qualified immunity . . . we have diverged from the
historical inquiry mandated by the statute.”).
128 William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 55 (2018); see
also Schwartz, supra note 127, at 1801–02, 1801 nn.24–26.
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personally sued for constitutional harms almost certainly will be indemnified
by the government.129
Alas, this overdue transition remains unrealized as of the date of this
writing. While ample opportunities have been presented each Term for
reconsideration of qualified immunity principles, the Supreme Court has
declined as of yet to accept review of a case that directly raises the question
whether the standard should be modified or abandoned.130
As a counterpoint to the above-described eclipse of a constitutional tort
remedy, an empirical study by Alexander Reinert found that plaintiffs bringing classic (and still surviving) Bivens claims achieve a substantial rate of success.131 Suits alleging unlawful search and seizure by federal law
enforcement in violation of the Fourth Amendment and by inmates alleging
prison conditions that violate the Eighth Amendment prevailed more than
twenty-five percent of the time.132 Bivens claimants generally succeed up to
nearly forty percent when represented by counsel.133 In sum, Bivens claims
appear to be working moderately well in the traditional areas where they
remain cognizable, but that universe is now closed to new types of constitutional tort claims.
E.

Adoption of Limited Collective Government Liability in the Federal Tort Claims
Act

While the federal damages remedy against the individual federal officer
has been in decline, Congress has waived sovereign immunity for many common-law tort claims to allow them to be brought directly against the federal
government. As Vicki Jackson writes, while “Congress and the Court narrowed the availability of actions against federal government employees,” so
also “Congress has expanded the area of government liability for tort.”134
129 Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014); see also
James E. Pfander, Alexander A. Reinert & Joanna C. Schwartz, The Myth of Personal Liability:
Who Pays When Bivens Claims Succeed, 72 STAN. L. REV. 561, 566 (2020) (finding that federal
officers held liable in Bivens claims were indemnified in 95% of cases and were covered for
99% of damages); David M. Shapiro & Charles Hogle, The Horror Chamber: Unqualified
Impunity in Prison, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2021, 2058–59 (2018) (“[T]here is reason to
believe that personal liability is just as mythical in prison cases as it is in police cases.”).
130 See, e.g., Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862, 1862 (2020), denying cert. to Baxter v.
Bracey, 751 F. App’x 869 (6th Cir. 2018); see also SCHWEIKERT, supra note 125, at 14.
131 Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for
the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 813 (2010). But see Schwartz et al., supra
note 118, at 1839 (expressing concern that “Ziglar appears to threaten the viability of even
well-settled forms of Bivens liability”); Leah Litman, Keynote Address at the University of
Notre Dame Law School Law Review Symposium (Jan. 15, 2021) (observing that courts are
now “narrowing the heartland of Bivens”).
132 Reinert, supra note 131, at 841 n.154.
133 Id. at 839 tbl.3.
134 See Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial
Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 564 (2003) (emphasis omitted).
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The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) was enacted in 1946 to waive the
sovereign immunity of the United States for state tort claims.135 Each year,
billions of dollars of claims are made against the United States under the
FTCA, although the actual recoveries of course are much smaller.136
The FTCA does not create any new causes of action nor does it formulate federal rules of substantive tort law. Instead, as the Supreme Court
stated in Richards v. United States,137 Congress determined “to build upon the
legal relationships formulated and characterized by the States” with respect
to principles of tort law.138
The FTCA provides that the “United States shall be liable . . . [for] tort
claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances.”139 In other words, the federal government is liable under the FTCA on the same basis and to the same extent as for a tort
committed under analogous circumstances by a private person in that particular state.140 “Although the federal government ‘could never be exactly like
a private actor, a court’s job in applying the standard is to find the most
reasonable analogy.’ ”141
The FTCA is not open-ended, however, excluding certain traditional tort
claims from its purview and setting out several government-specific exceptions. In particular, two of these—the intentional tort exception and the discretionary function exception—leave many victims of federal government
misfeasance and malfeasance without a remedy.
First, the intentional tort exception removes “a very considerable portion of the law of torts” altogether from the federal government’s consent to
suit.142 The text of the exception bars “[a]ny claim arising out of assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract
rights.”143 This exception includes most intentional torts (but not all, as tres135 Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The FTCA is one of about forty statutes waiving government immunity for torts, although the others tend to be narrow and involve specific programs, such as a provision for claims involving the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and a
statute allowing property damage claims by government employees. 1 LESTER S. JAYSON &
ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 1.01 (2021).
136 SISK, supra note 49, § 3.2, at 110.
137 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
138 Id. at 7.
139 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2018); see also id. § 1346(b)(1) (holding the United States liable
“if a private person[ ] would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred”). For further discussion of this private person
limitation, see infra notes 233–37 and accompanying text.
140 United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 44 (2005).
141 Dugard v. United States, 835 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting LaBarge v.
Cnty. of Mariposa, 798 F.2d 364, 367 (9th Cir. 1986)).
142 2 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 135, § 13.06[1][a].
143 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2018).
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pass, conversion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are not
listed).
There is an exception to the intentional tort exception, which eliminates
some but not all injustices. The United States may be held liable for certain
intentional torts when committed by “investigative or law enforcement
officers” of the federal government, as defined in § 2680(h).144
Second, the discretionary function exception to the FTCA precludes liability based on a government employee’s exercise or failure to exercise a “discretionary function or duty . . . whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.”145 The exception is grounded in separation of powers concerns,
preventing “judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium
of an action in tort.”146
If wantonly applied, the discretionary function exception could swallow
the general rule of generous liability under the FTCA. With ongoing confusion about whether the government may assert post hoc imagined policy justifications to cover over simple negligence, the risk remains that even
mundane or garden-variety matters could be excluded from the FTCA tort
remedy.147
Importantly, the discretionary function exception drops out of the case
altogether if the government actor had no discretion to exercise because a
statute, regulation, or policy directed the course of action. If “a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an
employee to follow,” then no discretion remains and “the employee has no
rightful option but to adhere to the directive.”148
II.
A.

THE FUTURE OPPORTUNITY FOR A MORE ROBUST TORT REMEDY
AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The Virtues of a Tort Remedy Directly Against the United States for Official
Wrongdoing

The modern statutory approach of a common-law tort remedy directly
against the United States149 roughly replicates the early historical approach
by which tort claims could be maintained against a federal officer who then
was indemnified for liability by Congress.150 As James Pfander writes, in the
nineteenth century, common-law suits against individual government officials
were “the cornerstone of government accountability.”151 This historically
144 Id.
145 Id. § 2680(a).
146 United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467
U.S. 797, 814 (1984).
147 See infra notes 238–68 and accompanying text.
148 Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
149 See supra Section I.E.
150 See supra Section I.A.
151 PFANDER, supra note 7, at 6.
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grounded, jurisprudentially familiar, and commonly invoked use of ordinary
tools of civil litigation to redress those who were wronged and hold the
wrongdoer accountable can be recovered today with relatively modest
reforms of the Federal Tort Claims Act.152
In the early republic, courts entertained common-law claims against federal officers for unlawful conduct that harmed individuals and then imposed
damages on the wrongdoers, uncomplicated by sovereign immunity or by
qualified immunity for officers.153 Harkening back to this nineteenth-century practice, James Pfander urges our twenty-first-century federal courts to
craft a revived and more powerful constitutional tort cause of action, one that
directly adjudicates the constitutional legality of the government conduct
and is not encumbered by the inappropriate political considerations and policy-justified hesitations that cloud current Bivens doctrine.154 As James
Pfander envisions it, this upgraded and enhanced Bivens constitutional tort
claim would be a contemporary version of the nineteenth-century trespass
action for official wrongdoing.
To get back to where we started in the early republic, James Pfander
argues that we do not need “the passage of more laws,”155 but rather that the
courts “should fundamentally rethink the manner in which they enforce constitutional rights protections through their Bivens jurisprudence.”156 I am
persuaded that James Pfander has identified a powerful prototype for governmental accountability. But I suggest that “the passage of more laws” is precisely what we should do to genuinely resurrect the nineteenth-century
practice of government accountability for official wrongdoing through the
simple format of an ordinary common-law tort action. As discussed in the
next Section,157 reform of the Federal Tort Claims Act can put claims against
the federal government for, not only negligence, but intentional wrongdoing
on more secure footing.
Those who advocate resurrecting or codifying the Bivens constitutional
claim are traveling on the same road with me toward greater governmental
accountability, even if we are traveling in different vehicles. I contend here
that a legislative transport has greater promise and that we should drive on
the more solid pavement of a tort remedy for official wrongdoing.
Reviving the nineteenth-century paradigm in the twenty-first century can
authentically be realized through an expanded statutory waiver of sovereign
immunity, by updating the existing remedy against the government through
the FTCA. Rather than creating any new causes of action or adding complexity into the civil litigation process, the FTCA “build[s] upon the legal relationships formulated and characterized by the States” with respect to
152 See infra Section II.B.
153 See supra Sections I.A, I.B.
154 PFANDER, supra note 237, at 99–100.
155 Id. at 159.
156 Id. at xvii.
157 See infra Section II.B.

R
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principles of tort law.158 To be sure, as James Pfander correctly observes, the
FTCA makes “no provision for constitutional suits against the federal government itself.”159 But neither did the nineteenth-century exemplar, which was
grounded in the common law. By holding the federal government accountable for “ordinary common-law torts,”160 the FTCA more closely resembles the
common-law trespass remedy to curb governmental wrongdoing than does
the judicially devised Bivens constitutional tort cause of action.
The advantages of ordinary tort law as the means to uphold accountability for wrongs may be overlooked for the very reason that, as John Goldberg
and Benjamin Zipursky note, “tort law is almost annoyingly conventional,
middle-of-the-road, and unexotic.”161 But, as they say, it is one of the great
“strengths” of the tort law that “it stands ready to hold us to familiar and
widely acknowledged responsibilities.”162 The consoling virtues of the established common-law tort approach for federal official accountability can be
illustrated through the examples of sexual assault by a federal employee, an
area where legislative attention to ensure a remedy is desperately needed,163
and of prisoner injuries due to unsafe prison conditions.
A claim for sexual assault by a federal official likely could be folded into
a constitutional tort claim under Bivens. As I’ve written previously, “the sexual violation of another” almost surely “crosses a constitutional line.”164 A
constitutional proscription of government-imposed sexual violence may be
located in the Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search
and seizure,165 the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment,166 the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause,167 protection of
bodily integrity,168 or the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection component
barring sexual violence that manifests gender discrimination.169 As the
Supreme Court has held, the Constitution plainly “withdraws from Government the power to degrade or demean.”170 Nonetheless, the federal courts
158 Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).
159 PFANDER, supra note 7, at 19.
160 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 28 (1953).
161 JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS 48 (2020).
162 Id.
163 See Sisk, supra note 11; see also infra Section II.B.
164 See Sisk, supra note 11, at 770.
165 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . . .”).
166 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”).
167 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”).
168 See Alexander v. DeAngelo, 329 F.3d 912, 916 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that “a rape
committed under color of state law” is a civil rights violation “as a deprivation of liberty
without due process of law” under the Fourteenth Amendment).
169 See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774 (2013) (“The liberty protected by
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains within it the prohibition against denying to any person the equal protection of the laws.”).
170 Id.
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have declined to extend the weakened Bivens claim to sexual violence by federal officers.171
Still, while constitutional law might accommodate civil damages remedies for sexual violence, a direct claim for sexual assault and battery through
the common-law cause of action requires no adjustment of existing principles
of liability. Tort law has long recognized such claims and today affords capacious damage remedies for the physical and emotional harm that follow from
this unique trespass on human dignity.172 With appropriate revision of the
FTCA to ensure that every sexual assault or battery at the hands of a federal
officer within the scope of employment is cognizable,173 that tort remedy
offers a robust and confident answer to a longstanding problem.
Another example demonstrates the considerable power of the commonlaw remedy. To prevail in a prison conditions case through an Eighth
Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment,174 which is one of the
continuing avenues for the now-limited Bivens constitutional tort cause of
action,175 a prisoner must establish that prison officials acted with “deliberate
indifference.”176 By contrast, a federal prisoner injured by a careless correctional officer or attacked by another prisoner due to neglectful security measures or inattention by a correctional officer may pursue a claim under the
FTCA for ordinary negligence under state tort law.177 Under this “negligent
guard theory” of tort liability, the FTCA tort plaintiff need show only a lack of
reasonable care,178 a standard well below deliberate indifference.
Another considerable practical advantage of the FTCA approach is that
it bypasses the officer indemnity request and imposes liability directly on the
United States. The nineteenth-century predecessor for addressing federal
officer wrongdoing did not impose liability directly against the United States
government, yielding to federal sovereign immunity.179 However, as James
Pfander writes, a “striking feature of the system [was] an expectation that the
officers in question would be indemnified and held harmless by Congress” by
enactment of private bills that covered the amount of any judgment against
171 See, e.g., Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36, 39–40, 44–47 (2d Cir. 2017); Klay v.
Panetta, 758 F.3d 369, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d 505, 516 (4th Cir.
2013).
172 Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, M. Neil Browne & Kathleen Maloy, Raped at Work: Just
Another Slip, Twist, and Fall Case?, 11 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 67, 95 (2000) (concluding that
“the long-term physical, psychological, and life-altering consequences of rape” demand
damages such as are available through “the option of tort remedy”).
173 See infra Section II.B.
174 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting infliction of “cruel and unusual
punishments”).
175 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–25 (1980).
176 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294, 302 (1991)).
177 See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 476–77 (2d Cir. 2006).
178 See id.; Coulthurst v. United States, 214 F.3d 106, 109–10 (2d Cir. 2000).
179 See supra Section I.A.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-5\NDL502.txt

1810

unknown

Seq: 22

notre dame law review

4-MAY-21

17:30

[vol. 96:5

the officer for damages.180 Although the doctrine of federal sovereign
immunity precluded vicarious employer liability of the federal government,
the equivalent was achieved by judicial imposition of damages against individual federal officers who crossed legal lines followed by congressional award of
indemnity to the officer. In the end, James Pfander reports, “Congress
accepted financial responsibility for government wrongdoing.”181 In this
way, as Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer observe, the indemnification practice “thereby convert[ed] what appeared to be a system of officers’ liability
into, for some if not all practical purposes, a regime of governmental
liability.”182
The FTCA enforces that governmental financial responsibility more
forthrightly by shifting liability from the officer to the United States. The
government is directly accountable, without the intermediary of an indemnification process. A true “regime of governmental liability” is forthrightly
accomplished.
And the statute removes the risk of undue sympathy by a trier of fact
toward a personally liable officer defendant. James Pfander and Jonathan
Hunt explain that the nineteenth-century system of direct officer liability followed by congressional indemnification “protected the officer from ruinous
liability, assured the victim of compensation, and overcame the doctrine of
sovereign immunity by ensuring that, at the end of the day, the government
paid for the losses its officials inflicted in the line of duty.”183 The modern
FTCA arrives at these goals in a straighter line.
Nearly forty years ago, Peter Schuck outlined the many downsides to
imposing damages liability on individual government officers rather than the
government itself: “its propensity to chill vigorous decisionmaking; to leave
deserving victims uncompensated and losses concentrated; to weaken deterrence; to obscure the morality of law; and to generate high system
costs . . . .”184 Likewise, Richard Pierce contends that “[e]xposing individual
government employees to potential tort liability is particularly likely to produce socially undesirable decisionmaking incentives.”185
After all, the government officer in the line of duty acts as an agent of
the government. Indeed, the government can act only through a human
agent. For those who suffer harm, whether described in terms of tort or constitutional injury, at the hands of a federal employee, the harm is likely to be
experienced as a wrong by the responsible government itself. As Harold
Lewis and Theodore Blumoff rightly remind us, “although a government acts
through individuals, it is ultimately the government’s conduct with which we
180 PFANDER, supra note 7, at xix.
181 Id. at 3.
182 Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1822 (1991).
183 Pfander & Hunt, supra note 42, at 1876.
184 See SCHUCK, supra note 112, at 100–02.
185 3 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 19.2, at 1765–73 (5th ed.
2010).
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are concerned.”186 Accordingly, it is just that the financial responsibility for
official wrongdoing be imposed on the federal government itself.
Moreover, a central goal is to hold the government itself accountable for
a wrong and to deter ongoing wrongdoing. As Akhil Amar argues in support
of state government liability:
The state entity itself will often be the source and the unjustly enriched beneficiary of illegal conduct by individual officials. Furthermore, general principles of modern tort theory and enterprise liability suggest that the
governmental entity will often be in a far better position than any individual
officer to restructure official conduct in a way that avoids future violation of
rights.187

Another virtue of the FTCA tort remedy is the removal of the complicating and diluting effect of the doctrine of qualified immunity that plagues the
development of constitutional law.188 By bringing damage claims about
unlawful acts inside the FTCA and using the traditional vehicle of commonlaw torts to redress governmental wrongdoing, the goal of clarity in articulating legal limits would also be achieved. Here too we replicate the effective
remedy provided in the early republic. Without any deflection by the doctrine of qualified immunity, nineteenth-century courts adjudicated the personal liability of a federal officer in tort and “increasingly came to
understand that their duty was to apply the law and determine . . . the legality
of official action.”189 The same follows under the common-law focused
approach of the FTCA.
When the United States is the defendant to a state tort law claim
through the FTCA, qualified immunity simply is not available as a defense.190
Instead, the defenses available to the federal government in an FTCA suit
“are defined by the same body of law that creates the cause of action, the
defenses available to the United States in FTCA suits are those that would be
available to a private person under the relevant state law.”191 And, again,
because the government is directly liable under the FTCA, the concerns animating qualified immunity—about imposing personal liability for understandable legal errors by an individual—fall off the table.

186 Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section 1983’s Asymmetry, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 755, 828 (1992) (footnote omitted).
187 Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1487–88 (1987).
188 See supra Section I.D.
189 PFANDER, supra note 7, at 9.
190 Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 609 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[Under the FTCA,] the
United States does not have the advantage of any defense of official immunity that the
employee might have had . . . .”).
191 Vidro v. United States, 720 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Brownback v. King,
141 S. Ct. 740, 746, 748 n.7 (2021) (declining to address “the availability of state-law immunities” in the context of an FTCA claim against a law enforcement officer for assault and
battery).
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Expanding the FTCA Remedy for a More Robust Response to Official
Wrongdoing

Some 150 years after ratification of the United States Constitution, Congress in 1946 took the then-bold step of generally consenting to common-law
tort claims against the United States.192 To be sure, a significant and selfinterested motivation for Congress to enact the FTCA judicial remedy was to
avoid the distracting work of considering a host of private bills to compensate
the victims of injuries caused by government employees.193 Yet, as the
Supreme Court later explained, the FTCA was also “the offspring of a feeling
that the Government should assume the obligation to pay damages for the
misfeasance of employees in carrying out its work.”194
Unfortunately, under the present legal regime, intentional official
wrongdoing at the federal level too often falls between the cracks of civil
accountability regimes. When federal agents are negligent, the injured have
a well-worn path to redress in court through the FTCA.195 The FTCA makes
the government itself liable for official carelessness under the tort law of the
state in which the harm occurred.196 But when government officials deliberately impose harm on others, the road to recovery is muddy and covered with
obstacles. The answer to this persistent and worsening problem lies not in
any hope for a judicial course correction, but rather in a legislative reform of
official liability for intentional wrongdoing by the federal government and its
agents.
When the FTCA was enacted three-quarters of a century ago, Congress
moved forward cautiously with what was then a novel initiative in waiving
federal sovereign immunity for tort claims.197 At a 1940 committee hearing,
Alexander Holtzoff, a Special Assistant to the Attorney General and regarded
by the Supreme Court as “one of the major figures” in the FTCA legislative
history,198 suggested to Congress that
[t]he theory of these exemptions is that, since this bill is a radical innovation, perhaps we had better take it step by step and exempt certain torts and
certain actions which might give rise to tort claims that would be difficult to

192 See supra Section I.E.
193 See SISK, supra note 49, § 3.2, at 109–10; Paul Figley, Ethical Intersections & the Federal
Tort Claims Act: An Approach for Government Attorneys, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 347, 348–51
(2011).
194 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 (1953).
195 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2018) (making the United States liable for the “negligent or wrongful act or omission” of a federal government employee).
196 See supra Section I.E.
197 See William P. Kratzke, Some Recommendations Concerning Tort Liability of Government
and Its Employees for Torts and Constitutional Torts, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1105, 1107 (1996);
Comment, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 547 & n.84 (1947); see also supra
Section I.E.
198 See Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 856 (1984).
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defend, or in respect to which it would be unjust to make the Government
liable.199

Most significantly, at least in terms of holding the federal government to
account for the most egregious wrongdoing, the FTCA originally excised
from its waiver claims for most intentional torts, including “[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or
interference with contract rights.”200 The breadth of these exceptions is
stunning, both in their explicit terms and in application. Not only are direct
vicarious liability/respondeat superior claims for assault and battery against
the United States plainly barred per the terms of the statutory exception, but
most courts have interpreted it to also preclude claims for negligent hiring or
supervision of federal employees who have a propensity for violence or
misconduct.201
In considering revisions to the FTCA, we might set claims for defamation
and misrepresentation to one side. The Supreme Court early on recognized
that, even with “the utmost vigilance,” to bind the federal government based
on improper statements by its many thousands of federal employees would
risk tremendous liability because the government’s “operations are so various, and its agencies so numerous and scattered.”202 Moreover, as Harold
Krent has observed, protecting the government from liability based upon
errors in communication “preserv[es] the government’s policy decision to
communicate information in the first instance.”203 Similarly, we should be
careful before allowing tort claims against the United States for interference
with contract and deceit (“deceit” denoting a common-law claim in a business or commercial sense).204 Such claims are better addressed through the
comprehensive statutory waivers for contract claims in the Contract Disputes
Act205 and the Tucker Act.206
199 Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings on H.R. 7236 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 22 (1940).
200 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2018). On the intentional tort exception, see generally SISK,
supra note 49, § 3.6(d), at 165–74.
201 See, e.g., CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 148–49 (3d Cir. 2008); Billingsley v.
United States, 251 F.3d 696, 698 (8th Cir. 2001); Perkins v. United States, 55 F.3d 910,
916–17 (4th Cir. 1995); Franklin v. United States, 992 F.2d 1492, 1499 n.6 (10th Cir. 1993);
Guccione v. United States, 847 F.2d 1031, 1033–34 (2d Cir. 1988); Stout v. United States,
721 F. App’x 462, 467 (6th Cir. 2018); Est. of Smith ex. rel. Richardson v. United States, 509
F. App’x 436, 442–43 (6th Cir. 2012); Reed v. U.S. Postal Serv., 288 F. App’x 638, 640 (11th
Cir. 2008).
202 United States v. Kirkpatrick, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 720, 735 (1824).
203 Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1553
(1992).
204 United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 706 & n.16 (1961) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 552 (AM. L. INST. 1938)).
205 Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7109 (2018). See generally SISK,
supra note 49, § 4.8(b), at 305–21.
206 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2018). See generally SISK, supra note 49, § 4.8(c), at 321–22 (discussing contract claims against the United States outside of the Contract Disputes Act).
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But it is impossible to justify the continuing exception to federal government accountability for such traditional claims as assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. The
cautious and incremental approach reflected in the FTCA’s initial waiver for
tort claims in 1946 cannot explain Congress’s ongoing silence. Claims
against the United States in court are no longer novel and innovative.207
Moreover, “a greater appreciation that responsible employers must be held
accountable for employment-related misconduct by their employees,
together with the social justice need to hold someone accountable to the
victim [of an assault or battery] mandate legislative change.”208
The first and most important step in legislative reform of the FTCA
came a half century ago in the enactment of the so-called “Law Enforcement
Proviso.” In 1974, responding to notorious episodes of abuses of federal law
enforcement power when mistakenly executing no-knock warrants on the
homes of innocent people,209 Congress revised the intentional tort exception of the FTCA to permit claims against the United States when the individual tortfeasor was a federal law enforcement officer. The Law Enforcement
Proviso directs that, “with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law
enforcement officers of the United States Government,” the general waiver
of sovereign immunity in the FTCA applies “to any claim arising . . . out of
assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution.”210
And yet the assault-and-battery exception remains an insuperable obstacle for those who are not so “fortunate” as to be victimized by a law enforcement officer. If the perpetrator is a military officer who abuses a recruit211 or
a mail carrier who molests children on a postal route,212 then the victim
likely has no remedy against the United States. As I’ve written elsewhere,
“Other than the accidents of history and momentary political attention to

207 For a summary list of the ever-expanding list of statutory waivers of federal sovereign
immunity over the decades, see SISK, supra note 49, § 2.4, at 88–93.
208 Sisk, supra note 11, at 777–78.
209 S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 2 (1973). On the history behind the enactment of the Law
Enforcement Proviso in 1974, see generally Jack Boger, Mark Gitenstein & Paul R. Verkuil,
The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts Amendment: An Interpretive Analysis, 54 N.C. L.
REV. 497 (1976).
210 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2018); see also Sisk, supra note 11, at 746–49.
211 See, e.g., Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36, 38–40 (2d Cir. 2017); Klay v. Panetta, 758
F.3d 369, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Gallardo v. United States, 755 F.3d 860, 862–63 (9th Cir.
2014); Olsen v. United States ex rel. Dep’t of the Army, 144 F. App’x 727, 732 (10th Cir.
2005).
212 See, e.g., LM ex rel. KM v. United States, 344 F.3d 695, 697 (7th Cir. 2003); Johnson v.
United States, 788 F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir. 1986); Hughes v. United States, 662 F.2d 219, 220
(4th Cir. 1981); West v. United States, No. EDCV 15-01243, 2016 WL 1576382, at *1–2
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2016); Hamburg v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. H-10-2186, 2010 WL 4226461,
at *1–2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2010).
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particular abuses by federal law enforcement 40 years ago, these contradictory results are inexplicable and morally unsustainable.”213
So why has nothing been done in the last half century? The heavy-lifting
was already done with the enactment of the Law Enforcement Proviso, with
one commentator saying that the door to eliminating the assault-and-battery
exception to the FTCA was thereby “three-quarters open.”214 Indeed, the
most difficult policy decision was already made by Congress. Because law
enforcement officers are authorized to use force as a direct part of their jobs,
unlike most federal employees, we may anticipate tort suits challenging that
exercise of force to raise “contentious debates about the validity of a particular search [and] heated disputes about the appropriate amount of force
properly exercised by armed police officers in conducting a specific
arrest.”215 And yet, without great controversy or excessive damage awards,
these FTCA tort claims have regularly been adjudicated in the federal courts
under the Law Enforcement Proviso over the past forty years.216 And still
Congress has been derelict in acting.
To make matters surpassingly worse, when the federal government does
escape liability through such exceptions to the FTCA as that for assault and
battery, the injured party may be unable to pursue an alternative claim
against the individual officer under state tort law. When the FTCA was
enacted in 1946 with its intentional tort exception, Congress could not have
anticipated the enactment some fifty years later of the Westfall Act. Remember that when a federal employee was acting within the scope of employment, the Westfall Act simultaneously substitutes the United States as the
only defendant and immunizes the officer from personal liability.217 If and
when the common-law tort claim against the United States is cognizable
under the FTCA, the substitution of one financially responsible defendant
for another is unremarkable. But with the excision of entire categories of
familiar torts from the FTCA, the government may escape accountability
while the immunity of the individual federal employees remains intact.218 As
a consequence, in the words of the Supreme Court, the victim of an FTCAexcluded tort claim “may be left without a tort action against any party.”219
When the FTCA was originally enacted in 1946, the exclusion of intentional torts from the FTCA tended to run parallel with state respondeat supe213 Sisk, supra note 11, at 740.
214 Jack W. Massey, Note, A Proposal to Narrow the Assault and Battery Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1621, 1636 (2004).
215 Sisk, supra note 11, at 780.
216 See, e.g., Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 854–55 (9th Cir. 2007); St. John v.
United States, 240 F.3d 671, 675–78 (8th Cir. 2001); Washington v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 183
F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 1999); Red Elk v. United States, 62 F.3d 1102, 1104–07 (8th Cir.
1995); Dickey v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 3d 366, 373–74 (D.D.C. 2016); Moher v.
United States, 875 F. Supp. 2d 739, 756–60 (W.D. Mich. 2012); Hanson v. United States,
712 F. Supp. 2d 321, 326–27 (D.N.J. 2010).
217 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2018); see supra Section I.C.
218 See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
219 Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 420 (1995).
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rior rules that generally held the intentional tortfeasor-employee outside the
scope of employment and thus subject to personal liability.220 Moreover, the
Westfall Act had not yet been enacted, so claims against a federal employee,
even for a wrong committed in the line of duty, were not automatically extinguished. Thus, while an assault or battery committed by a federal employee
fell outside of the FTCA waiver for vicarious liability in tort against the
United States, that claim could be pursued against the individual employee
for personal liability.221
However, in the three-quarters of a century since the FTCA was enacted,
and in the three decades since the Westfall Act was enacted, state respondeat
superior rules have continued to expand to impose vicarious employer liability for more and more intentional conduct by employees.222 Under modern
principles of tort accountability, an employer may be vicariously liable for an
intentional tort by an employee when the work assignment, the context of
the employment activities, special relationships created with others, or other
factors make even such outrageous misconduct by an employee a reasonably
foreseeable harm from the enterprise activities.223
Translating that state doctrinal expansion of respondeat superior into
the immunity directive of the Westfall Act means that a federal employee who
commits an assault or battery might be held to have acted within the scope of
employment, thereby immunizing that employee from personal liability even
while the FTCA excuses the government for the same wrongdoing. And that
may lead to the repugnant result that neither the government that employs
the agent nor the agent him or herself is answerable to the victim of violence
at the hands of that government agent. For all of these reasons, as I’ve
described it elsewhere, “a dreadful delinquency has overtaken the law.”224
As a morally indefensible example of how this horrifying possibility
could unfold, I refer to my prior work seeking federal accountability for the
degrading act of sexual violence by a federal employee:
It is intolerable that the federal government should hold itself and its agents
exempt from legal responsibility for sexually-motivated or other assaults and
batteries against its own people. Indeed, it would be the height of hypocrisy
for the United States to enforce new laws and legal initiatives against sexual
assault in other contexts, while refusing to be held accountable for its own
misconduct. It is unthinkable that the survivor of sexual violence would be
left without any remedy in any court against either the government itself or
its individual employees.
And yet the intolerable, the hypocritical, and the unthinkable describe
the reality. Under decades-old federal statutes that have gone unrevised
even while the legal and cultural landscape has changed, the sovereign
United States is absolutely immune from liability in tort for any assault and
battery—sexual or otherwise. And the federal employee who commits sex220
221
222
223
224

See
See
Id.
Id.
Id.

Sisk, supra note 11, at 765–66.
id.
at 766–69.
at 739.
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ual violence may likewise obtain federal immunity from liability under state
tort law.225

The only solution to this current unacceptable situation is a legislative
repeal of the intentional tort exception to the FTCA. The words “assault”
and “battery”—ideally also including the words “false imprisonment,” “false
arrest,” “malicious prosecution,” and “abuse of process”—should be stricken
from the statutory exception to the FTCA.226 This overdue legislative reform
would simultaneously (1) hold the federal government itself appropriately
accountable for unjustified acts of violence in the line of duty and (2) bring
that governmental acceptance of responsibility into line with the extension of
tort immunity to individual employees in the Westfall Act.227
The evolution of the law demands this repeal of the intentional tort
exception to the FTCA lest the victims of intentional wrongdoing at the
hands of government be left without any remedy in any court against any
defendant. An enhanced Federal Tort Claims Act that provides a remedy not
only for negligent misfeasance but also for intentional malfeasance would
restore the clarity in legal accountability for governmental wrongdoing that
prevailed for nearly a century in American courts.228 This worthy goal would
be accomplished by the most common of legal remedies and through the
most familiar of civil litigation processes, simply by truly holding the federal
government accountable for “ordinary common-law torts.”229
C.

Clarifying the Exceptions to Tort Liability for Governmental Policymaking

When contemplating government accountability for official wrongdoing,
certain quintessentially governmental functions, notably policymaking deliberations, should not be second-guessed through the ill-suited vehicle of a tort
suit. Richard Pierce offers the common-sense observation that “[t]he process
of governing almost always helps some and hurts others, but those who are
hurt should not necessarily be entitled to damages from the government.”230
While the processes of administrative law allow judicial review of policymak225 Id. at 734–35 (emphases added) (footnote omitted).
226 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2018).
227 See Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature
of the Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 578 (2013) (arguing that, if the Westfall Act
entirely displaces common-law claims against a federal officer acting in contravention of
constitutional rights, the courts must replace the preempted state-law remedies with
equivalent federal remedies); James E. Pfander & David P. Baltmanis, Response, W(h)ither
Bivens?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 231, 232, 247 (2013) (same). Because of other statutory provisions, the federal civilian or military employee who is the victim of sexual violence at the hands of another federal employee encounters additional obstacles to
compensation, which require additional legislative reforms beyond eliminating the FTCA’s
intentional tort exception. See Gregory C. Sisk, The Peculiar Obstacles to Justice Facing Federal
Employees Who Survive Sexual Violence, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 269. Those additional reforms are
also set out in the Addendum to this Article.
228 See supra Section I.A.
229 See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 28 (1953).
230 3 PIERCE, supra note 185, § 19.4, at 1819.
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ing to ensure compliance with procedures and are subject to generally deferential standards of review,231 the business of government ought not be
adjudicated as a tort claim in court. Democratic governance demands that
policy disputes proceed in public political venues.
Before Congress shifted hard toward the extreme of complete absolution through the Westfall Act for any misfeasance by a federal employee in
the line of duty, the Supreme Court had been inching toward a sensible and
nuanced approach of disallowing common-law tort suits only where government officers were exercising policymaking functions.232 The Court
endorsed immunity from tort liability for federal officers who exercised “decisionmaking discretion” such as “policy-making work.”233
The Federal Tort Claims Act likewise was framed to shield certain
aspects of government activity from tort liability, thus distinguishing misgovernment from misfeasance in the realm of common-law liability imposed on the
United States. Two parts of the statute protect against undue intrusion into
peculiarly governmental activities, although the second discussed below has
mushroomed in the lower federal courts into a broad defense for the government that sweeps beyond any legitimate solicitude for policymaking
judgment.
First, the federal government’s amenability to tort suit under the FTCA
applies to “circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred.”234 As Lester Jayson and Robert Longstreth write,
this “private individual” or “private person” language “means . . . that the Act
does not create new causes of action—in the sense of inventing new types of
torts.”235 The Supreme Court has clarified that the mere fact the duties at
issue are formally unique to the government is not sufficient to remove FTCA
liability, as the statute refers to “like” rather than “same” circumstances.236
The Court has emphasized that the standard of tort liability requires comparison of the government’s conduct to that of private parties, meaning that the
lower courts should have looked for a private counterpart.237
Even if a federal officer has negligently failed to uphold a public responsibility, the absence of a common-law claim that would apply to analogous conduct by a private person leaves the matter outside the FTCA. For example,
where an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation negligently failed to
231 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2018). See generally SISK, supra
note 49, § 4.10, at 337–40.
232 See supra notes 69–77 and accompanying text.
233 Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 297, 299 (1988).
234 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2018); see also id. § 2674 (directing that the United States is
liable in tort “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances”). On the private person limitation, see generally SISK, supra note 49,
§ 3.5(c), at 137–47.
235 2 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 135, § 9.08[1].
236 United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 46 (2005); Indian Towing Co. v. United States,
350 U.S. 61, 64 (1955).
237 Olson, 546 U.S. at 47.
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accept the surrender of a bank robber, thinking the call was a jest, the United
States was not liable to the survivors of the person later murdered by this
person.238 Because the duty to apprehend a criminal suspect is a public duty,
with no private counterpart, the FTCA is not the proper vehicle for objecting
to the government’s failure. Government action in a regulatory role is especially likely to have no persuasive private analogy for imposing FTCA liability.
Second, the discretionary function exception to the FTCA bars a claim
against the United States when tort liability is based on a government
employee’s exercise or failure to exercise a “discretionary function or duty
. . . whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”239 When properly
applied, this exception avoids “judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and
administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy
through the medium of an action in tort.”240 When injudiciously applied, as
too often has become the case in the lower federal courts, the discretionary
function exception may make the FTCA an empty promise by shielding the
federal government from liability for the ordinary failures of due care.
As Peter Schuck warned some time ago, federal courts should resist the
temptation to broadly interpret the discretionary function exception “to
immunize routine low-level implementation of high-level policy decisions.”241 To give effect to Congress’s intent “to compensate individuals
harmed by government negligence,” the courts should liberally construe the
FTCA and narrowly construes its exception.242
Unfortunately, in the lower federal courts, simple failures in public
safety have regularly been levitated into imaginary policy meditations. With
acquiescence by the courts, government litigators have transformed the discretionary function exception into a sweeping immunity for official wrongdoing in areas of mundane activity and on matters that are far removed from
the arena of policy judgment.
The lower federal courts have bemoaned the “difficulty of charting a
clear path through the weaving lines of precedent” on the discretionary function exception.243 On occasion, courts have commendably rested on common sense to reject the government’s attempt to clothe the most mundane
or “garden variety” conduct in policy judgment immunity.244 In addition,
scientific and professional judgments on matters of safety should not be
238 McCloskey v. Mueller, 446 F.3d 262, 264–70 (1st Cir. 2006).
239 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2018). On the discretionary function exception, see generally
SISK, supra note 49, § 3.6(b), at 153–64.
240 United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467
U.S. 797, 814 (1984).
241 SCHUCK, supra note 112, at 114.
242 Terbush v. United States, 516 F.3d 1125, 1135 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting O’Toole v.
United States, 295 F.3d 1029, 1037 (9th Cir. 2002)).
243 Whisnant v. United States, 400 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Shansky v.
United States, 164 F.3d 688, 693 (1st Cir. 1999) (referring to “some disarray” in application
of the discretionary function exception).
244 Cestonaro v. United States, 211 F.3d 749, 755–56 (3d Cir. 2000); ARA Leisure Servs.
v. United States, 831 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1987).
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treated as exercises in policy deliberation.245 With routine questions of
safety measures taken for the protection of the public, the discretionary function exception should not be invoked whenever there is the “faintest hint of
policy concerns.”246 Rather, the exception should be reserved for when governmental activities are “fraught with . . . public policy considerations.”247
Similarly, some lower courts have been rightly skeptical that the minimal
budgetary impact that underlies nearly any choice of action constitutes the
type of economic policy that could trigger the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.248 As a court said, “Were we to view inadequate funding
alone as sufficient to garner the protection of the discretionary function
exception, we would read the rule too narrowly and the exception too
broadly.”249
Unfortunately, sensible restraint has just as often been lacking in the
lower federal courts. The government has proven adept at converting any
failure to exercise due care, even on the most commonplace matters, into
some policy premise that overrides public safety.250 And yet balancing of
efficiency, costs, and aesthetics against the risk of harm is the kind of analysis
made regularly by private entities and that is grist for the mill of tort adjudication when the balance struck was unreasonable. As a dissenting judge sensibly observed, in a case asking whether government maintenance employees
should have inspected and removed a tree that fell on a sleeping camper,
“This case does not call on us to judge the wisdom of any social, economic, or
political policy, but rather simply to perform the familiar role of determining
whether the government agent exercised reasonable care.”251
The most pernicious error in discretionary-function-exception jurisprudence has been the willingness of lower courts to accept “a few after-the-fact
declarations [by government officials] submitted in litigation attempting to
show why such a decision, had it been made, would have been justified by
245 See Whisnant, 400 F.3d at 1181.
246 Cope v. Scott, 45 F.3d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
247 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 767 (D.C.
Cir. 1979)).
248 Gibson v. United States, 809 F.3d 807, 813 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing O’Toole v. United
States, 295 F.3d 1029, 1035–37 (9th Cir. 2002)) (“[B]udgetary constraints on their own are
often an insufficient policy goal to trigger the exception’s protections.”).
249 O’Toole, 295 F.3d at 1037.
250 See, e.g., Lam v. United States, 979 F.3d 665, 670–71, 681–82 (9th Cir. 2020) (applying discretionary-function-exception immunity for allegedly negligent failure to identify
and remove a hazardous tree in a park that fell on a camper); Gonzalez v. United States,
851 F.3d 538, 541–42, 545–46 (5th Cir. 2017) (applying discretionary-function-exception
immunity for allegedly negligent failure to inspect and maintain a bike path and warn of a
hazard in a national forest resulting in injury to a biker); Chadd v. United States, 794 F.3d
1104, 1107–08, 1114 (9th Cir. 2015) (applying discretionary-function-exception immunity
for allegedly negligent failure to destroy a dangerous mountain goat that gored and killed
a hiker); S.R.P. ex rel. Abunabba v. United States, 676 F.3d 329, 330–31, 342 (3d Cir. 2012)
(applying discretionary-function-exception immunity for allegedly negligent failure to
warn swimmers near national monument of risk of barracuda attack).
251 Lam, 979 F.3d at 688 (Hurwitz, J., dissenting).
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policy.”252 The courts are regularly asked to apply the discretionary function
exception when the government cannot show that any genuine policy judgment was made, but argues that it could have been. When government litigators adduce minimally plausible post hoc policy rationalizations, then the
courts are expected to pronounce the matter as “susceptible to policy analysis” and apply the exception regardless of whether the alleged tortious “conduct was ‘the end product of a policy-driven analysis.’ ”253
In a startling departure from the animating purpose of the FTCA’s discretionary function exception to bar judicial second-guessing of executive
policy decisions, these courts say that it is “largely irrelevant” whether “government agents . . . did or did not engage in a deliberative process before
exercising their judgment.”254 But the risk of judicial second-guessing of
executive policymaking vanishes when the government action involved no
actual policymaking judgment. The courts should not be asked to defer to
the clever imaginings of government lawyers who postulate a hypothetical
policy judgment that was never made.255
Empirical studies have found that the “susceptible to policy analysis”
standard “has greatly restricted the federal government’s tort liability for all
but the most mundane transgressions,”256 has proven so subjective as to allow
federal judges to be influenced by political ideology in ruling on government
motions to dismiss,257 and has elevated the government’s success rate for
dismissal of FTCA cases to nearly seventy-five percent.258 In sum, government lawyers have been effective in leveraging this malleable susceptibility
standard to extend the discretionary function exception through post hoc
rationalizations of policy factors that supposedly could have justified the government agent’s action or inaction.
252 Chadd, 794 F.3d at 1128 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
253 Sánchez ex rel. D.R.-S. v. United States, 671 F.3d 86, 93 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting
Shansky v. United States, 164 F.3d 688, 692 (1st Cir. 1999)); see also Kiehn v. United States,
984 F.2d 1100, 1105 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that, if policy was potentially implicated, then
“it is unnecessary for government employees to make an actual ‘conscious decision’ regarding policy factors” (quoting Johnson v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 949 F.2d 332, 339 (10th Cir.
1991)).
254 Baum v. United States, 986 F.2d 716, 721 (4th Cir. 1993).
255 I am presently at work on a larger study of this “susceptibility-to-policy-analysis” misadventure in interpretation of the FTCA’s discretionary function exception, which I have
tentatively titled “Immunity for Imaginary Policy Judgments Under the Federal Tort Claims
Act.”
256 Bruce A. Peterson & Mark E. Van Der Weide, Susceptible to Faulty Analysis: United
States v. Gaubert and the Resurrection of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
447, 448 (1997).
257 Robert C. Longstreth, Does the Two-Prong Test for Determining Applicability of the Discretionary Function Exception Provide Guidance to Lower Courts Sufficient to Avoid Judicial Partisanship?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 398, 405–06 (2011).
258 Stephen L. Nelson, The King’s Wrongs and the Federal District Courts: Understanding the
Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 259, 290
(2009).
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Lower court “jurisprudence in this area has gone off the rails”259
because of a misunderstanding about a statement by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Gaubert.260 The Gaubert Court said the discretionary function
analysis as applied to a complex regulatory action involving a troubled financial institution should focus on “the nature of the actions taken and on
whether they are susceptible to policy analysis.”261 This key language in
Gaubert cannot be divorced from its regulatory context, as the Court there
directed that plaintiffs protesting a federal takeover and operation of the
financial institution must show that “the challenged actions are not the kind
of conduct that can be said to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory
regime.”262 Moreover, that contextual understanding of Gaubert fits comfortably within the Supreme Court’s line of precedents, which have described the
discretionary function exception as designed to prevent “liability arising from
acts of a governmental nature or function”263 and “to encompass the discretionary acts of the Government [when] acting in its role as a regulator of the
conduct of private individuals.”264
The Supreme Court in Gaubert was not inviting the government to envision a policy basis after the fact for careless behavior arising outside of the
policy-permeated context of a complex regulatory regime. Nothing in the
language of Gaubert “switches the foundational question from whether the
decision was ‘based on considerations of public policy’ to whether it hypothetically could have been.”265 When the action involved did not involve
peculiarly governmental responsibilities such as federal regulation of private
activities that directly implicate “the policy of the regulatory regime,”266 then
the government cannot ask courts to close judicial eyes to government carelessness that only pretends to be policymaking.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the other part of the discretionary
function exception, often overlooked because it is so rarely invoked,
powerfully protects the central policymaking activities of the federal government. The first phrase in the exception excludes liability based on “an act or
omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be
valid . . . .”267 In this way, the wisdom of a statute enacted by Congress or a
regulation codified by an executive agency may not be the subject of a common-law tort action. As I’ve written previously, “the enactment of a statute or
259 Chadd v. United States, 794 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2015) (Berzon, J.,
concurring).
260 499 U.S. 315 (1991).
261 Id. at 325.
262 Id. at 324–25.
263 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 28 (1953).
264 United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467
U.S. 797, 813–14 (1984).
265 Chadd v. United States, 794 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2015) (Berzon, J.,
concurring).
266 Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325.
267 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2018).
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promulgation of a regulation cannot be characterized as a negligent act of
governance.”268
Importantly, by the express terms of the statute, the negligent implementation of a statutory or regulatory directive—the failure to “exercis[e]
due care” in doing so269—is not shielded from tort liability. Just as the failure by a federal employee to obey a statutory or regulatory directive deprives
the government of immunity because there was no discretion available,270
carelessness in carrying out a statutory or regulatory directive cannot be characterized as a policy choice.
D.

With a Tort-Based Remedy for Official Wrongdoing, Constitutional Norms
Remain at the Heart of the Analysis

Constitutional principles remain central to adjudication of tort claims
against the federal government. First, ordinary tort claims, such as false
arrest or false imprisonment, may be defeated by the presence of probable
cause as a common-law equivalent to constitutional expectations.271 Likewise, certain defenses, such as the justified use of force in response to a common-law assault and battery claim, may be refuted by asserting the equivalent
of constitutional violations. Second, the invocation of discretionary policy
immunity under the FTCA is precluded when constitutional limits are transgressed, as no federal officer has discretion to bypass constitutional
requirements.272
Because the doctrine of qualified immunity is misplaced in a tort
regime, these commands of the Constitution should be directly enforced,
without the diluting appraisal of whether the constitutional directive was
clearly established in prior court precedent. Indeed, because the question of
legal authority in common-law claims and the discretionary function exception to the FTCA often are affirmative defenses, the government may bear
the burden of proving that its conduct upheld constitutional norms.273
1.

For Many Common-Law Tort Claims, an Element or Defense of
Probable Cause or Justification Runs Parallel to Constitutional
Constraints

When federal sovereign immunity is waived for common-law tort claims
against the United States, the common law defines the elements of the cause
of action and available defenses. By expressly providing that the liability of
the United States is to be determined “in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual,”274 the FTCA speaks not only to the plaintiff’s
268 SISK, supra note 49, § 3.6(b)(1), at 154.
269 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2018).
270 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
271 See infra subsection II.D.1.
272 See infra subsection II.D.2.
273 See infra notes 276–78 and 308–11 and accompanying text.
274 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2018).
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cause of action but also to the defendant’s substantive defenses, including
affirmative defenses of legal authority. As one court of appeals correctly
observed, “As immunities and defenses are defined by the same body of law
that creates the cause of action, the defenses available to the United States in
FTCA suits are those that would be available to a private person under the
relevant state law.”275
Under the common law, those elements or defenses frequently include
the equivalent of constitutional expectations. Accordingly, by adjudicating
official wrongdoing through the means of a tort cause of action, constitutional norms are upheld. For example, probable cause is an element or
affirmative defense to the common-law claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution,276 the same concept to be found in the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 277 Similarly, a common-law claim of assault or battery may be defended by asserting that the
force used was reasonable to make a citizen’s arrest or prevent lawless conduct.278 While the probable cause requirement or the justifiable use of force
defense in tort claims draw life from the common law, rather than directly
from the Constitution, the concepts are unsurprisingly the same.279 After all,
the Bill of Rights was designed to preserve the preexisting natural rights that
had been recognized in the common law.280
275 Vidro v. United States, 720 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir. 2013).
276 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 3d 112, 122 (D.D.C. 2015) (describing
District of Columbia law as providing that a lack of probable cause is an element of claims
for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution); Taylor v. Collins, No. C-392-121, 1998 WL 1657173, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 6, 1998) (stating that, under Ohio law,
“[p]robable cause is also an affirmative defense to the common law tort of false arrest”);
Reed v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 873 P.2d 98, 109 (Haw. 1994) (“The determination of
probable cause is a defense to the common law claims of false arrest, false imprisonment,
and malicious prosecution.”); Lewis v. Farmer Jack Div., Inc., 327 N.W.2d 893, 901 (Mich.
1982) (stating that, under Michigan law, a false arrest or imprisonment is an arrest or
imprisonment “without legal justification”); see also Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989, 1000
(2021) (observing that the common-law tort of false imprisonment is the equivalent of an
arrest without probable cause).
277 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
278 See, e.g., Gortarez ex rel. Gortarez v. Smitty’s Super Valu, Inc., 680 P.2d 807, 814–15
(Ariz. 1984) (explaining that a shopkeeper may use “[r]easonable force” to detain a shoplifter and overturning a directed verdict for the store when a security guard used a
chokehold (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 120A cmt. h (AM. L. INST.
1965))); People v. Garcia, 78 Cal. Rptr. 775, 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (stating that a private
citizen making a citizen’s arrest is “justified in using such force as was reasonable for defendant’s arrest and detention”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 132 (AM. L. INST. 1965)
(“The use of force against another for the purpose of effecting the arrest or recapture of
the other, or of maintaining the actor’s custody of him, is not privileged if the means
employed are in excess of those which the actor reasonably believes to be necessary.”).
279 See Smith, 121 F. Supp. 3d at 118 (applying the same probable cause concept to both
the tort false arrest claim and the arrest-related Fourth Amendment Bivens claim).
280 ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 15–16 (rev. ed. 1954)
(“[T]he common-law rights of Englishmen [became] the natural rights of man,
intrenched as such in our bills of rights.”).
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In this way, the FTCA regime largely, but somewhat more straightforwardly, replicates the paradigm of the early republic by authorizing a common-law tort remedy against the government subject to constitutional or
quasi-constitutional adjudication of the legal authority for the government
action.281 Akhil Amar relates the early nineteenth century practice in the
context of an unauthorized search or seizure:
Plaintiff would sue defendant federal officer in trespass; defendant would
claim federal empowerment that trumped the state law of trespass under the
principles of the supremacy clause; and plaintiff, by way of reply, would play
an even higher supremacy clause trump: Any federal empowerment was
ultra vires and void because of Fourth Amendment limitations on federal
power itself. If, but only if, plaintiff could in fact prove that the Fourth
Amendment had been violated, defendant’s shield of federal power would
dissolve, and he would stand as a naked tortfeasor.282

Importantly, under the FTCA, the defenses available to the United States
are those that would be “available to a private person under the relevant state
law.”283 The current provisions of the FTCA that permit intentional tort
claims, particularly the Law Enforcement Proviso, view an action based on a
state common-law tort through the lens of private liability. As the Supreme
Court emphasized in FDIC v. Meyer,284 state—not federal—law is “the source
of substantive liability under the FTCA.”285
For this reason, no qualified immunity or official defenses may be
asserted to defend the actions of an executive branch employee, even if the
pertinent state law accords special protections to government-employed
police officers or correctional officers in that state.286 By making the United
States subject to suit for the acts of government employees acting within the
scope of employment, “the United States stands in the shoes [of] a similarlyplaced private employer” when answering for the allegedly tortious conduct
of its employees.287 From the earliest days of the FTCA, the courts have recognized that the doctrine of respondeat superior for tort liability of the
281 See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Was Bivens Necessary?, 96 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1893, 1897 (2021) (explaining that the Framers expected that, in common-law
trespass actions against government officials, “the Constitution would negate a defendant’s
plea of legal justification”).
282 Amar, supra note 187, at 1506–07.
283 Vidro v. United States, 720 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir. 2013).
284 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
285 Id. at 478. See generally SISK, supra note 49, § 3.5(b)(2), at 135–37.
286 Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 609 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he United States does
not have the advantage of any defense of official immunity that the employee might have
had . . . .” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2674)); Farag v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 436, 452
(E.D.N.Y. 2008); see also Brownback v. King, 141 S. Ct. 740, 746, 748 n.7 (2021) (declining
to address “the availability of state-law immunities” in the context of an FTCA claim against
a law enforcement officer for assault and battery).
287 Lomando v. United States, 667 F.3d 363, 374–76 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Xue Lu v.
Powell, 621 F.3d 944, 947–49 (9th Cir. 2010) (evaluating the FTCA liability of the United
States as a private employer under state law).
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United States under the FTCA does not permit the government to invoke the
immunities of its officers. 288
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Muniz289 directly
answers the question of governmental immunity under the FTCA. In Muniz,
the Court held that state jailer defenses cannot be invoked by the United
States under the FTCA:
Jailers in some States are not liable to their prisoners. . . . And there are
overtones in these decisions suggesting that liability is also denied because of
the fear that prison discipline would otherwise be undermined. Such cases
should not be persuasive. Just as we refused to import the “casuistries of
municipal liability for torts” . . . , so we think it improper to limit suits by
federal prisoners because of restrictive state rules of immunity.290

For FTCA liability, the comparison is to a private person engaging in
those activities, not to a state or local officer. In United States v. Olson,291
injured mine workers claimed that the United States should be held liable
under the FTCA for negligent inspection of the mine by federal mine inspectors, that is, failing to discover safety violations by the mine operator that
resulted in an accident.292 The Ninth Circuit looked to liability based on
Arizona law making state or municipal entities liable for safety inspections.293
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the proposition that the United
States may be held liable through the FTCA based upon state law standards
that were designed for imposing liability upon state or municipal entities.294
In language directly repudiating special governmental defenses, the Olson
Court emphasized: “The Act says that it waives sovereign immunity ‘under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person,’ not ‘the United
States, if a state or municipal entity,’ would be liable. Our cases have consistently adhered to this ‘private person’ standard.”295
In Tekle v. United States,296 a court of appeals reversed the dismissal of
intentional tort claims, including assault and battery, under the FTCA that
arose from detention of a juvenile while federal law enforcement officers
were making an arrest.297 The lead opinion highlighted the Supreme Court
decision in Olson as overturning a prior approach, which had mistakenly
applied the unique law governing arrests by officials rather than the private
law standard of citizen arrests to FTCA actions.298 Ruling that law enforcement privileges could no longer be invoked by federal law enforcement
288 See Wright v. United States, 719 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Trubow, 214 F.2d 192, 196 (9th Cir. 1954).
289 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
290 Id. at 164.
291 546 U.S. 43 (2005).
292 Id. at 45.
293 Id.
294 Id. at 45–46.
295 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)).
296 511 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2007).
297 Id. at 850–56.
298 Id. at 851–52.
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agents, the opinion emphasized that “Olson states in broad terms that the
words of the FTCA ‘mean what they say, namely, that the United States waives
sovereign immunity “under circumstances” where local law would make a
“private person” liable in tort.’ ”299 Other courts of appeals agree that the
United States may not invoke special state-government immunities under the
FTCA.300 While a federal law enforcement officer has the authority to use
reasonable force to effectuate an arrest, even when a citizen arrest could not
be made, Congress did not intend to allow the United States the benefit of
any state-law immunities available to only state employees.301
The proscription on invoking special governmental immunities is confirmed by the text of another provision of the FTCA, which states that the
United States may raise “any defense based upon judicial or legislative immunity which otherwise would have been available to the employee of the
United States whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, as well as any
other defenses to which the United States is entitled.”302 The first clause
departs from the general private person standard of the FTCA to preserve
official immunity to judges and legislators under the traditional protections
for exercise of the special judicial and legislative roles.303 By the omission of
parallel protection in the FTCA for official immunities for executive branch
officials, the FTCA plainly directs that those “other defenses to which the
United States is entitled” must be evaluated under the applicable state law for
private persons.
For FTCA cases, appropriate “private person analogies for Government
tasks of this kind” must be identified.304 For law enforcement, in addition to
the citizen arrest analogy, we may find counterparts through the tort standards for private security guards (such as those at a private college or business) and the traditional shopkeeper’s privilege when upholding security in a
facility or establishment.305 Similarly, for correctional officers, the private
analogy lies in the affirmative duty to protect when a party takes custody of

299 Id. at 852 (quoting Olson, 546 U.S. at 44).
300 See, e.g., Villafranca v. United States, 587 F.3d 257, 263–64 (5th Cir. 2009); Castro v.
United States, 34 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1994).
301 See Villafranca, 587 F.3d at 263–64; Castro, 34 F.3d at 111.
302 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2018).
303 See, e.g., Richardson v. United States, 516 F. App’x 2 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding the
United States entitled to judicial immunity under the FTCA for actions by court clerks in
the judicial process); Lucore v. Bowie, No. 12-CV-1288, 2012 WL 5863248, at *2 (S.D. Cal.
Nov. 16, 2012) (dismissing a claim under the FTCA based on a judge’s alleged improper
adjudication of a bankruptcy case).
304 Olson, 546 U.S. at 47.
305 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–10, Olson, 546 U.S. 43 (No. 04-759) (“[S]o if
it’s a police officer stopping somebody on a highway, it’s the same as a private security
guard stopping somebody . . . .”).
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person,306 such as a nursing facility employee who has a duty to ensure the
safety of those who reside at the facility.307
As discussed above, under an FTCA tort-based regime to address intentional wrongdoing at the federal level, constitutional-equivalent justifications
for the federal agent’s conduct such as probable cause or justified use of
force sometimes must be raised as an affirmative defense under the pertinent
state tort law.308 In those jurisdictions, the affirmative defense to an intentional tort claim would turn on whether probable cause or justified use of
force provided legal permission for the individual employee’s conduct. Previous ambiguity in the law would not count as a valid justification for unlawful
conduct. As also noted above, there is no legitimate basis for transplanting a
qualified immunity doctrine that the law must have been clearly established
into the common-law soil of the FTCA. As with the nineteenth-century
regime, the FTCA approach should allow an individual plaintiff to obtain tort
damages, leaving the “issue of whether the action was authorized by existing
statutory or constitutional law [to be] introduced by way of defense and reply
when the officer pleaded justification.”309
2.

For the FTCA’s Discretionary Function Exception, Discretion Is
Withdrawn When Constitutional Directives Are Violated

With regard to the policy-protecting exception to the FTCA, any discretionary-function-exception immunity is withdrawn when federal government
officials transgress constitutional lines. As “[f]ederal officials do not possess
discretion to violate constitutional rights,”310 the discretionary function
exception does not “shield conduct that transgresses the Constitution.”311
While the constitutional barrier against claims of policymaking discretion may resemble the Supreme Court’s direction that discretion is also lacking when a federal employee fails to follow a statute or regulation that
specifically prescribes the course of action,312 the analysis is not precisely the
same. When a statute or regulation does not specifically set out the precise
parameters, the federal employee continues to possess residual authority as
an executive branch officer. By contrast, when the Constitution precludes
the action, whether or not that constitutional command is precisely ascer306 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (AM. L. INST. 1965).
307 Est. of Smith v. Shartle, No. CV-18-00323, 2020 WL 1158552, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 10,
2020) (holding in FTCA case that duty of correctional officers is “[l]ike a nursing facility
employee, . . . tasked with the care of persons who are dependent upon them to make daily
housing and safety determinations”); see also Panion v. United States, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1071,
1089 (D. Haw. 2005) (holding the same).
308 See supra notes 276–79 and accompanying text.
309 Woolhandler, supra note 68, at 399.
310 Medina v. United States, 259 F.3d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 2001) (alteration in original)
(quoting U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 837 F.2d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 1988)).
311 Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79, 101 (1st Cir. 2009).
312 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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tained prior to application in the particular case, the discretion is removed
entirely, and no remnant of general executive authority remains.313
The substantial majority of circuits has recognized that a discretionary
function defense is incompatible with a constitutional prohibition.314 A few
judges have contended that policymaking discretion may somehow survive a
constitutional collision and allow the United States to still evade liability
under the FTCA. These contrary arguments range from the confused contention that the state-law focus of the FTCA affirmative claim somehow controls interpretation of the federal policy exception and over to the tired
proposition that waivers of sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed in
favor of the government.
First, judicial naysayers protest that “the theme that ‘no one has discretion to violate the Constitution’ has nothing to do with the Federal Tort
Claims Act, which does not apply to constitutional violations.”315 This argument confusingly transports the correct observation that the FTCA, “applies
to torts, as defined by state law”316 (that is, the common-law nature of the
cause of action) into an incongruous interpretation of the distinctly federal
nature of the discretionary function defense, which is not at all “defined by
state law.” To be sure, the plaintiff’s affirmative cause of action must be
grounded in state tort law, not federal law, whether that federal law is constitutional or statutory.317 But that point leads us nowhere when we turn to the
meaning of the discretionary function exception as a special federal-government defense, which of course is found nowhere in state tort law. Moreover,
contrary to this muddled argument, the Supreme Court has already emphasized that the boundary of the discretionary function exception is marked by
federal, not state, law, when ruling that discretion is removed when “a federal
statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an
employee to follow.”318
313 See Castro v. United States, 560 F.3d 381, 389 (5th Cir. 2009) (explaining that proving a federal officer violated constitutional rights would “eclipse” the discretionary-function-exception analysis), vacated on other grounds, 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(per curiam) (affirming district court without addressing the constitutional limit on the
discretionary function exception); Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739, 757–58 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that individual defendants had qualified immunity on a Bivens claim because the
law was not clearly established, but that the finding that the First Amendment was violated
precluded application of the discretionary function exception to the FTCA claim against
the federal government).
314 See, e.g., Loumiet v. United States, 828 F.3d 935, 943–46 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Limone,
579 F.3d at 101; Galvin, 374 F.3d at 758; Thames Shipyard & Repair Co. v. United States,
350 F.3d 247, 254–55 (1st Cir. 2003); Raz v. United States, 343 F.3d 945, 948 (8th Cir.
2003); Medina, 259 F.3d at 225; Prisco v. Talty, 993 F.2d 21, 26 n.14 (3d Cir. 1993); see also
Myers & Myers, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 527 F.2d 1252, 1261 (2d Cir. 1975) (“It is, of
course, a tautology that a federal official cannot have discretion to behave unconstitutionally or outside the scope of his delegated authority.”).
315 Linder v. United States, 937 F.3d 1087, 1090 (7th Cir. 2019).
316 Id.
317 See supra notes 283–85 and accompanying text.
318 Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988) (emphasis added).
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Second, saying that “[i]t is difficult to conceive of a violation of a constitutional right that does not also give rise to a state cause of action,” one judge
complains that disallowance of the discretionary function exception when
the government agent acts unconstitutionally effectively transforms the FTCA
into a vehicle for a constitutional tort claim.319 But this argument proves too
much. To be sure, as discussed earlier,320 common-law tort claims often
include elements or defenses that parallel constitutional concepts. That
hardly changes the important legal classification that the FTCA claim must
be drawn from state tort law and cannot be founded on federal constitutional
provisions.
As one court of appeals explains, this argument “miscast[s] the relationship between FTCA state-law torts and Bivens constitutional claims. The statelaw substance of an FTCA claim is unchanged by courts’ recognition of constitutional bounds to the legitimate discretion that the FTCA immunizes.”321
Acknowledging that a state tort cause of action, such as one for false arrest,
incorporates a federal constitutional equivalent, such as probable cause,322 as
an element or defense is not at all the same as pronouncing that the claim
may be pleaded directly under the Constitution. Moreover, that state common-law claims often provide relief through the FTCA for wrongs that also
transgress the Constitution is a mark in favor of the FTCA as effectively holding the federal government to account for wrongful conduct.
In any event, this objection is lodged in the wrong forum. It is the Congress that has explicitly waived the sovereign immunity of the United States
for state common-law tort claims that may well “overlap[ ] with [a] constitutional violation.”323 In particular, through the Law Enforcement Proviso,
Congress has made the United States liable for such intentional torts as
assault, battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment when committed by
“investigative or law enforcement officers” of the federal government.324
Thus, Congress, not the courts, has determined through the FTCA generally
and the Law Enforcement Proviso in particular that it is quite appropriate to
hold the federal government responsible in tort for that type of conduct that
may well transgress the Constitution but which necessarily forms the elements or defenses of a state-law tort claim.
Third, the advocates for discretionary policy immunity even when the
Constitution has been violated cite the hoary adage that limits on waivers of
federal sovereign immunity must be construed strictly in favor of the government.325 The rusty aphorism that the government should win every interpre319 Castro v. United States, 560 F.3d 381, 394 (5th Cir. 2009) (Smith, J., dissenting),
vacated on other grounds, 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam).
320 See supra subsection II.D.1.
321 Loumiet v. United States, 828 F.3d 935, 945 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
322 See supra note 276–80 and accompanying text.
323 See Castro, 560 F.3d at 394 (Smith, J., dissenting).
324 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2018). On the Law Enforcement Proviso, see supra notes
209–10 and accompanying text.
325 Castro, 560 F.3d at 393 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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tive debate involving a statutory waiver of federal sovereign immunity appears
to have been retired by the Supreme Court. Today, the Court reserves strict
construction to core questions about whether sovereign immunity has been
expressly waived and the basic scope of that waiver.326 For other statutory
terms, definitions, exceptions, limitations, and procedures, ordinary rules of
statutory interpretation suffice.327 As I’ve written before:
Having traveled away from a petrified regime of jurisdictional absolutes and
wooden strict construction, the Supreme Court now directs a more nuanced
reading of statutory waivers of federal sovereign immunity to both protect
important government interests identified by Congress and to uphold the
statutory promise of the judicial remedy, with careful attention to text, context, history, and statutory purpose elevated above mechanical application of
presumptions.328

And in the very context of exceptions to the FTCA, the Supreme Court has
repudiated strict construction, saying “this principle is ‘unhelpful’ in the
FTCA context, where ‘unduly generous interpretations of the exceptions run
the risk of defeating the central purpose of the statute,’ which ‘waives the
Government’s immunity from suit in sweeping language.’ ”329
In sum, the discretionary function exception to the FTCA “does not
shield decisions that exceed constitutional bounds, even if such decisions are
imbued with policy considerations.”330 As the Supreme Court has said in
another context, no government agency or official has “ ‘discretion’ to violate
the Federal Constitution; its dictates are absolute and imperative.”331
Finally, the United States as the defendant to an FTCA suit should bear
the burden to prove that the discretionary function exception applies as an
affirmative defense.332 Thus, the government must show that its purported
exercise of policymaking functions was not only genuine but did not transgress constitutional boundaries.
326 See FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 290–91 (2012) (stating that the demand for an
“unequivocally expressed” waiver of sovereign immunity extends to the “scope of that
waiver” (first citing Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996); then citing United States v.
Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992); and then citing Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs.,
498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990))); see also Gregory C. Sisk, Twilight for the Strict Construction of Waivers
of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1245, 1300–18 (2014).
327 See Gómez-Pérez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 490–91 (2008); Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95–96.
328 SISK, supra note 49, § 2.5, at 94.
329 Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 491–92 (2006) (citations omitted) (first
quoting Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 853 n.9 (1984); and then quoting United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 547 (1951)).
330 Loumiet v. United States, 828 F.3d 935, 944 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
331 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 649 (1980).
332 S.R.P. ex rel. Abunabba v. United States, 676 F.3d 329, 333 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2012);
Myers v. United States, 652 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 2011); Parrott v. United States, 536
F.3d 629, 634–35 (7th Cir. 2008); Carlyle v. U.S., Dep’t of the Army, 674 F.2d 554, 556 (6th
Cir. 1982). On the exceptions to the FTCA as nonjurisdictional affirmative defenses, see
generally SISK, supra note 49, § 3.6, at 150–53.
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CONCLUSION
From the time of the early republic, as Ann Woolhandler explains, “the
historic role of suits against government officials was not to punish bad faith
behavior, but rather to enforce constitutional and statutory limitations on
government.”333 During the twentieth century, the federal government’s sovereign immunity was waived for more and more remedies, including tort
claims against the United States, holding the government directly to account
for wrongdoing. The line between an official wrong and government
accountability became straighter. As David Engdahl rightly reasons, “[I]f the
onus is to rest ultimately upon the [government], it seems both more fair
and more efficient to place it there directly.”334
Unfortunately, the expansion of liability in tort by the federal government slackened in the twentieth century, right about the time that immunity
for individual federal employees thickened into an impenetrable shield
against tort claims. As a result, the gap widened between the statutory waiver
for government liability in the Federal Tort Claims Act and the withdrawal of
tort liability for federal officers in the Westfall Act. As a consequence, victims
of the most egregious wrongdoing by federal agents are left without any remedy and the federal government refuses to accept accountability for many
affirmative harms.
At this opportune moment in the early twenty-first century, all of the
pieces are nearly in place and remain only to be assembled. By modest legislative reform of the Federal Tort Claims Act to cover intentional harms by all
federal employees in the line of duty and by judicial clarification that discretionary function immunity protects only genuine policymaking deliberations,
the existing tort-based framework will cover most harms suffered through
official wrongdoing. Through a legislatively revised FTCA and a judicially
confined policy immunity, the courts may more robustly protect individual
rights and articulate fundamental limitations on justifiable government
action.

333 Woolhandler, supra note 68, at 483.
334 Engdahl, supra note 46, at 58.
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SOVEREIGN

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That—
SEC. 1. Section 2680(h) of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
(1) striking out the words “assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process,” in the first sentence; (2) striking
out the second and third sentences reading “Provided, That, with regard to
acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United
States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this
title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of
this proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of
process, or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, ‘investigative or law enforcement officer’ means any officer of the United States
who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make
arrests for violations of Federal law”; and (3) inserting at the end of the section the following: “Further provided, That, a sexual assault or sexual battery
on a military servicemember shall not be regarded as incurred incident to
service.”
SEC. 2. Section 2000e-16 of title 42, United States Code, is amended by
inserting at the end of subsection (c) the following: “The remedy for personal injury arising from a sexual assault or sexual battery or negligent failure
to prevent a sexual assault or sexual battery that is cognizable under chapter
171 of Title 28 is not preempted by other remedies available by law under
this subchapter.”
SEC. 3. Section 8116 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by
inserting at the end of subsection (c) the following: “The remedy for personal injury arising from a sexual assault or sexual battery or negligent failure
to prevent a sexual assault or sexual battery that is cognizable under chapter
171 of Title 28 is not preempted by other remedies available by law under
this subchapter.”

335 This proposed legislative reform includes additional changes to remove peculiar
obstacles to federal employees in seeking recovery under the FTCA for sexual assault, as
described in Sisk, supra note 227.
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